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Abstract
Pursuant to its federally-recognized plenary power over
Indian affairs, Congress enacted the Indian Civil Rights Act in
1968 as a major civil rights initiative aimed at filling the gap in
civil rights enforcement within tribal communities. Its aim was to
bind tribes, who otherwise are not accountable to the protections
of the United States Constitution, to most of the rights protected
in the 14th Amendment and Bill of Rights. For nearly a decade
after its passage, federal courts reviewed claims of rights
violations brought against tribes and those acting on their behalf
in an official capacity under basic federal jurisdictional statutes
like 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and § 1343, providing some measure of
accountability for individual civil rights. That practice ended in
1978, when the Supreme Court decided the watershed case of
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, a decision that foreclosed
remedial relief in the form of equitable relief and damages and
left ICRA’s habeas provision the only possibility for federal
judicial review.
While Santa Clara Pueblo left interpretive room for
federal courts to exercise jurisdiction over rights claims brought
under ICRA in which individuals have been detained or restricted
in geographical movement, federal courts have continued to
restrict jurisdiction under ICRA since then to such an extent that
it has become nearly impossible for individuals to gain actual
redress for violations of rights expressly delineated and protected
by ICRA. One way this has occurred is through the federal courts’
collective diminishment of what constitutes a detention sufficient
to involve habeas relief. Courts also elevate the interests of tribes
through loose application of judicially-created principles of
exhaustion and mootness, based on the state of affairs that exists
not just at the time of filing but during the pendency of federal
habeas cases as well. In many cases, these narrowing stances are
taken in purported deference concerns about tribal sovereignty
but without careful identification or evaluation of what the
Review (CLR) Workshop held at New York University School
of Law, New York, New York on September 21, 2018.
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sovereign impacts may actually be. In some cases, the sovereign
interests of the tribe and its membership may best be advanced
through federal court review of individual rights violations. The
federal trust responsibility may also be implicated. The courts are
wrong to summarily defer to the presumed interests of tribes
without careful analysis of these goals.
Focusing on the courts’ interpretation of what constitutes
a “detention” sufficient to invoke ICRA’s habeas jurisdiction, this
article contains an exhaustive analysis of federal ICRA cases
published since Santa Clara Pueblo. It demonstrates how exactly
federal jurisdiction has been defined and diminished and how this
departs from Congress’s original intent. Not only do these
interpretations thwart Congress’s intent, virtually eliminating
federal review in all but the most extreme instances of physical
restraint where all available tribal remedies are deemed to have
been exhausted, but in many instances, they also do injustice to
the federal policy of respect for tribal sovereignty and selfdetermination. If deference to sovereignty is to be a factor, a more
exacting and case-by-case standard must be developed and
adhered to, or ICRA is but a hollow promise.
I. Introduction
66
II. ICRA Background and Congressional Policy and
Intent
78
A. Early Interpretation and Enforcement of ICRA 81
B. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez
84
III. Federal Court Interpretation of Detention Under
§ 1303
89
A. Habeas Under § 1303
92
B. Scope of Custody in the Context of State and
Federal Action
93
C. Detention Under ICRA’s § 1303
100
D. Applicability of ICRA’s Habeas Provision
107
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IV. Diverse Contexts Interpreting “Detention”
Requirement
111
A. Actual Incarceration
113
B. Judicial Control and Restraint Pending
or Following Judicial Action
119
C. Challenges to Tribal Court Child Custody
Determinations
122
D. Physical Banishment, Ejectment, Physical and
Geographical Restraint
125
E. Membership and Disenrollment
136
F. Land Disputes
143
G. Miscellaneous Circumstances which have been
Held NOT to Meet the Standard for Habeas
Review
156
V. The Evolution of ICRA Under Federal Court
Review
160
A. Revisiting Congress’ Expressed Goals
160
B. Even the Availability of Habeas has been
Diminished by the Federal Courts in Ways that
Thwart Congressional Intent
171
C. Problems in the Application of ICRA
174
VI. Conclusion
189
I. Introduction
The recognition of fundamental civil or human
rights, even ones guaranteed under a Bill of Rights or
Constitution, depends not just on their codification under
law but on their enforceability. While the very existence
of individual rights as a matter of legal or constitutional
mandate may guide and limit government action, there
inevitably will be encroachments. When that occurs,
there must be effective remedies for seeking redress and
correcting government practices or actions or the rights
functionally cease to exist. “When one's civil liberties are
infringed, there must be a process to challenge that
[66]
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injury, an opportunity to be heard, and, critically, a
system of judicial review to test the legitimacy of that
deprivation.”1 As explained by the Supreme Court in its
first case recognizing the right of judicial review of
constitutional matters: “The very essence of civil liberty
certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim
the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an
injury. One of the first duties of government is to afford
that protection.”2
For rights violations perpetuated by state and
local officials and governments, Congress has enacted
civil rights legislation providing for causes of action,
enabling both state and federal court to ascertain
remedies.3 The creation of federal courts with
independence and jurisdiction to hear matters arising
under federal law provides a forum for those concerned

Brief of Andrea M. Seielstad, as Amicus Curiae in Support
of Petitioner at 3, Tavares v. Whitehouse, No. 17-429, 2017
WL 4857396, at *3 (Oct. 23, 2017) (citing Boumediene v.
Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 741 (2008).
2 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803).
3 The primary legislative enactment setting forth causes of
action for violations of individual rights by state and local
officials is 42 U.S.C. §1983. This has been interpreted and
expanded by the Supreme Court. For example, the Supreme
Court has interpreted 28 U.S.C. § 1983 as authorizing
individuals to seek judicial review of constitutional rights
violations that occur at the hands not just of officials but of
state and local governmental institutions themselves where
their policies or customs result in a deprivation of an
individual’s civil rights. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Serv.’s,
436 U.S. 658, 690 (1977).
1
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about their reception in state and local courts.4 When
federal officials violate individual rights, a federal cause
of action has been directly implied from the
Constitution.5 This combination of congressional
legislation and judicial decision-making has established
a path by which individuals may seek legal redress in the
form of civil actions seeking both damages and injunctive
relief for violations of their rights.6 The statutory
availability of attorney fees expands the opportunities for
legal representation as well.
In addition to these civil remedies, for violations
that infringe directly upon liberty, the writ of habeas
corpus, or “great writ of liberty,”7 as it is often called, has
First enacted in 1875, Congress has created federal
question jurisdiction in the federal courts. 28 U.S.C. § 1331
(2012); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (2012).
5 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397-98 (1971); see also Wounded
Knee Legal Def./Offense Comm. v. F.B.I., 507 F.2d 1281, 1284
(8th Cir. 1974) (citing Bivens as authority for federal courts
to grant injunctive relief, as well as monetary relief, in
actions brought against federal agents). As a prerequisite to
recovery in such an action, a plaintiff must of course show
deprivation of a constitutionally protected right. See McNally
v. Pulitzer Publ’g Co., 532 F.2d 69, 76 (8th Cir. 1976).
6 Additionally, there may be local, state or federal
administrative remedies or criminal prosecution investigated
and advanced by executive agencies and officials. The scope
of this paper, however, will focus on private causes of action
and legal remedies that may exist.
7 See, e.g., ERIC M. FREEDMAN, HABEAS CORPUS: RETHINKING
THE GREAT WRIT OF LIBERTY 147–53
(2001);
see
also
Whitmore v. Avery, 63 F.3d 688, 693 (8th Cir. 1995)
(discussing changes in the scope of habeas in the context of
procedural default of state proceedings: “Habeas corpus, once
taken seriously as the ‘great writ of liberty,’ now bears that
label with irony, if at all.” (citing Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S.
200, 225 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“‘The
4
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been a “vital instrument” to check governmental power
and secure remedies from unlawful restraint.8 Dating
back to English common law in the 14th century, it is a
judicial remedy whose goal is to provide relief against the
arbitrary use of government authority to imprison or
otherwise restrict the liberty of individuals without just
cause.9 Colonial courts recognized the writ as matter of
common law, as modern courts continue to do.10 The writ
is recognized in the U.S. Constitution, which provides:
"The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be
suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion
the public Safety may require it."11 In the Judiciary Act
of 1789, Congress granted the federal courts jurisdiction
over habeas corpus to persons in federal custody or who
were charged and set for trial before a federal court.12 In
1867, at the height of post-Civil War reconstruction
during which time some states and local authorities
resisted adherence to federal civil rights laws, that
Congress bestowed the right in federal court to challenge

great writ of liberty’ ought not be treated as though we were
playing a game.”)).
8 See Boumedine v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 739–740 (2008)
(discussing the history of the writ of habeas corpus).
9 See id. at 740.
10 See, e.g., id. at 774 (stating that even the provisions of the
relatively contemporary Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996 “did not constitute a substantial
departure from common-law habeas procedures.”).
11 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
12 The Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73.
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unlawful state deprivation of liberty through the writ of
habeas corpus.13
Thus, by 1867, individuals who were unlawfully
detained in violation of the Constitution, treaties or any
law of the United States could seek release in federal
court using the writ of habeas corpus, whether they were
detained pursuant to federal or state authority.14
Although there has been an ebb and flow to the scope of
the writ, particularly with respect to federal challenges
to state detentions, the remedy of habeas corpus remains
a crucial tool against arbitrary and unlawful rights
violations that result in deprivation of liberty.15
Additionally, those whose federally guaranteed rights
have been encroached upon by federal, state or local
authority, as indicated above, may seek injunctive relief
and damages through other federal causes of action.16

Amending the Judiciary Act of 1789, the Act granted
federal courts the power to issue writs of habeas corpus "in
all cases where any person may be restrained of his or her
liberty in violation of the constitution, or any treaty or law of
the United States.” Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, ch. 28,
14 Stat. 385. See generally Lewis Mayers, The Habeas Corpus
Act of 1867: The Supreme Court as Legal Historian, 33 U. CHI.
L. REV. 31 (1965) (providing a historical overview of the
Habeas Corpus Act); William M. Wiecek, The Great Writ and
Reconstruction: The Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, 36 J.S. HIST.,
530 (1970) (providing a history of the Habeas Corpus Act).
14 Wiecek, supra note 13, at 531 (describing the evolution of
habeas corpus petitions in 1867).
15 Federal Judicial History, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.
gov/history/courts/jurisdiction-habeas-corpus
[https://perma.cc/HR6T-ALFQ].
16 See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau
of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397-98 (1971); see also Wounded
Knee Legal Def./Offense Comm. v. F.B.I., 507 F.2d 1281, 1284
(8th Cir. 1974) (citing Bivens as authority for federal courts
13
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This ensures accountability by government officials at all
levels of federal, state and local government to the civil
rights laws of this nation.
The path for recognition of individual rights of
Native Americans vis-a-vis tribal government action has
taken a different, much more circumscribed path to
federal recognition. Because tribes enjoy some measure
of inherent sovereignty that predated the formation of
the United States Constitution, they are not subject to
the Bill of Rights or other Constitutional restrictions.17 It
was not until 1968, moreover, that Congress exercised its
plenary power over tribal affairs and enacted the Indian
Civil Rights Act (hereinafter “ICRA”). The ICRA bestows
on tribes the requirement, as a matter of federal
statutory law, that they adhere to fundamental rights
similar to those of the Bill of Rights.18
With respect to enforcement of ICRA’s
substantive provisions, however, the Supreme Court
determined in the case of Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez
that Congress authorized federal review only when
grounds for relief under the writ of habeas corpus exist.19
While individuals must establish that a violation of one
of the substantive provisions of ICRA has occurred and,
sometimes, that they have exhausted tribal remedies, the
key interpretive issue is whether the circumstances of
to grant injunctive relief, as well as monetary relief, in
actions brought against federal agents).
17 See Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384 (1896) (finding that
the laws of the Cherokee nation do not fall within the Fifth
Amendment).
18 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (2012).
19 Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 70 (1978); see
also 25 U.S.C. § 1303 (2012).
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their rights violations may qualify for habeas relief under
the act: namely, whether a “detention” has occurred
under § 1303.20 Thus, in contrast to federal, state and
local encroachments of federal substantive rights, the
writ of habeas corpus is the only federal remedy available
for those impacted by tribal officials or actions. Unless
tribes independently provide for them within their own
tribal court system, which is not universally the case,
there are no causes of action that may be construed for
damages or injunctive relief outside of the scope of
habeas.21
Since Santa Clara Pueblo, a number of
individuals impacted by very serious encroachments of
their rights by tribal officials and possessing no further
remedies within their tribal systems of justice have
sought federal recognition and enforcement under
ICRA’s habeas provision in last ditch efforts to avert
harm to the freedom and livelihood of individual tribal
members as well as to the interests of the sovereign
itself.22 In some cases, individuals have been arrested
and incarcerated by order of tribal court or council
without counsel, jury trial or other due process.23 In
See Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 59.
See id. at 70-72.
22 The banishment and disenrollment cases often implicate
complex issues impacting the sovereignty and selfdetermination of the tribal membership at large in addition
to those of individual petitioners since such situations impact
core issues such as the size and identity of those who may be
recognized as tribal members as well as disputes over
leadership authority, models of governance and economic
development. See infra notes 168–217 and accompanying
text. So, too, do cases impacting use and occupancy rights to
land. See infra notes 218–253 and accompanying text.
23 See Barbara Creel, The Right to Counsel for Indians
Accused of Crime: A Tribal and Congressional Imperative, 18
MICH. J. RACE & L. 317, 351–55 (detailing impacts in federal
20
21
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others, they have been banished, disenrolled, or excluded
from tribal facilities, services and cultural events.24
Judges and tribal court advocates have been removed
from office in retaliation for decisions or advocacy that
challenged certain tribal action or officials.25 When
accompanied by disenrollment from tribal membership,
individuals’ political, cultural and legal identity and
status as an Indian and member of a distinctive tribe
proceedings on failure of tribal courts to guarantee defense
counsel to those charged with crimes); see also infra notes
153–159 and accompanying text. In addition to this scholarly
article, Professor Creel, over many decades of strenuous
professional commitment, has advanced judicial, scholarly
and practical understanding of ICRA and its impact on
individual rights and tribal sovereignty in significant and
innovative ways. Many of the habeas cases that have been
filed on the matter of the Indian Civil Rights Act are the
result of Professor Creel’s work, individually and in her
supervisory capacity of students enrolled in the University of
New Mexico School of Law’s Southwest Indian Law
Clinic. She is also generous in sharing her expertise with
others who are engaged in this work at the tribal and federal
levels, and I am one who is particularly grateful to her for
those efforts.
24 See infra notes 165–94 and 195–217 and accompanying
text.
25 See, e.g., Payer v. Turtle Mountain Tribal Council, No. A403-105, 2003 WL 22339181, at *5 (D.N.D. Oct. 1, 2003)
(termination and replacement of their roles by tribal council
members from school where they served as elected board
members and grant administrators after securing $29 million
in federal funding did not constitute a detention; even where
council terminated tribal judge who reinstated petitioners
and punished another for attempting to enforce that order,
tribal court was their only forum in which to seek remedy).

[73]
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may be lost altogether. The ramifications to individuals
are often devastating, and there can be an impact as well
on the collective interests of the tribe.26 This article
explores the scope of the remedies available for federal
redress under ICRA and the federal courts’ response to
jurisdictional challenges brought by tribes in an effort to
remove cases from the boundaries of ICRA’s habeas
provision.
While
some
decisions
have
rendered
interpretations of ICRA’s
habeas requirement
commensurate in scope to that of habeas relief
challenging custodial situations under federal and state
authority, a number of decisions have limited federal
court review of individual rights much more narrowly.
Indeed, it may be argued that such interpretations
virtually eviscerate Congressional intent in enacting
ICRA. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez put the brakes on
federal review of ICRA’s substantive rights, citing a
Congressional policy toward deference to tribal
sovereignty and the need for federal judicial restraint in
encroaching on it; but it did not preclude federal court
review of tribal violations of its substantive rights
altogether. Nor does it warrant restrictions in federal
review beyond those inherent in the habeas remedy
itself.27
With some exceptions, lower court opinions since
Santa Clara Pueblo have effectively denied relief to
individuals in ways unanticipated by Congress or the
Supreme Court. This has particularly been the case with
respect to exclusion and enrollment cases wherein tribal
officials, often pressured or induced by distribution of
gaming revenues and/or efforts by individual tribal
26 For some of the impacts, see Brief of Andrea M. Seielstad,
as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 6, Tavares v.
Whitehouse (No. 17-429) 2017 WL 4857396, at *6.
27 Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 70 (1978).
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members to advocate for accountability of tribal officials,
have sought to dis-enroll or exclude tribal members from
tribal census rolls and services.28 The Ninth Circuit, in
recent cases, has exacted a particularly severe toll on the
ability of individuals to seek redress for violations of
rights guaranteed to them under ICRA.29
In many cases, the rejection of federal jurisdiction
is premised upon a summary and abstract deference to
tribal sovereignty concerns.30 Federal courts, in those
instances, often make general reference to a policy of
deference to tribal sovereignty concerns without

For a comprehensive analysis of the phenomenon of tribal
disenrollment, see Gabriel S. Galanda & Ryan D.
Dreveskracht, Curing the Tribal Disenrollment Epidemic: In
Search of a Remedy, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 383, 383 (2015) (“Chiefly
caused by the proliferation of Indian gaming revenue
distributions to tribal members over the last 25 years, the
rate of tribal disenrollment has spiked to epidemic
proportions. There is not an adequate remedy to stem the
crisis or redress related Indian civil rights violations.”).
Efforts to challenge these decisions abound, under ICRA and
other actions. See, e.g., Alto v. Black, 738 F.3d 1111 (9th Cir.
2013); Jeffredo v. Macarro, 599 F.3d 913 (9th Cir. 2010);
Timbisha Shoshone Tribe v. Kennedy, 687 F.Supp.2d 1171
(E.D. Calif. 2009); Quair v. Cisco, 359 F. Supp. 948 (E.D.
Calif. 2004).
29 See, e.g., Tavares v. Whitehouse, 751 F.3d 863, 876-77 (9th
Cir. 2017), cert. denied 138 S. Ct. 1323 (2018). For a fuller
discussion of the case and ways in which it limits jurisdiction
under ICRA, see infra notes 107–25; 212–17 and
accompanying text.
30 See, e.g., id. at 878 (leaving the remedy in the case to the
tribal courts).
28
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analyzing the particular sovereign interests or impacts
that are present in any given case.31
Tribes are often treated as monolithic units for
the purposes of application of federal law, bestowed with
common attributes of sovereignty and the need for
deference to it. However, not all exercises of sovereignty
are similar or based on exercise of inherent or internal
tribal sovereign interests. Sometimes actions that violate
individual rights, may also damage a tribes’ sovereign
interests and ability to engage in self-determination as
well. For example, where a tribe takes land set aside for
the purpose of individual and family livelihood and
residence to further private development interests, there
may be a net loss to the community of livable spaces. In
many cases, federal funds or legal interests are
implicated and/or outside private financial or business
enterprises are driving the tribal action in ways that are
not necessarily in the interests of collective selfdetermination of a particular tribal nation. Sometimes
personas acting as tribal officials may act outside the
boundaries of recognized governance structures to the
grave detriment of the community, entering into
questionable financial arrangements, taking land,
compromising tribal programs and services, and/or disenfranchising or dis-enrolling members critical to the
long-term sustainability of the tribe itself. While it is true
that restraint on federal court review may be warranted
with respect to some intratribal disputes, denying federal
review may also have a devastating impact not just on
the inability of individuals to have ICRA’s substantive
rights be recognized and enforced but on the sovereignty
and well-being of the tribe as a whole. In any case, as
discussed more fully below, more exacting criteria for
rejecting review in the name of sovereignty should be
31

See infra notes 324–29 and accompanying text.
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applied by the federal courts, with an eye toward
maximizing the interests of the individuals involved as
well as the tribal community.
Focusing on the ICRA’s habeas provision under §
1303, this article analyzes and critiques federal court
interpretation and application of the scope of ICRA’s
habeas relief since Santa Clara Pueblo. Part II
establishes the background of ICRA and its habeas
corpus provision. Part III sets forth the courts’
interpretation of what it means to be detained for the
purposes of ICRA’s federal habeas relief, dividing cases
into the different contexts in which the grounds for
habeas have been denied as well as those where
detention has been found to exist, i.e., from actual
incarceration to exertion of supervisory control by tribal
courts or officials to banishment and other forms of
physical restraint. Part IV describes federal court
interpretation of “detention” in the context of § 1303,
delineating how the 9th Circuit and some lower court
opinions have restricted the scope of detention beyond
the scope afforded in the context of federal and state
proceedings.
The article argues, in Part V, how these narrow
interpretations are wrong. Not only do they misinterpret
Congress’ goal in enacting ICRA, virtually eliminating
federal review in cases other than actual incarceration,
but they may also do injustice to the goal of selfdetermination and deference to tribal sovereignty that is
often articulated as a reason to decline jurisdiction. In
deciding what weight to ascribe and how to incorporate
the interests of tribal sovereignty in any particular case,
federal courts should conduct a more exacting analysis of
the circumstances. As articulated in the Conclusion such
[77]
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analysis should include considerations of the harm
exacted on the individual petitioners as well as the
community at large, the nature and source of the
authority of the tribal actors encroaching on petitioners’
rights, or the impact on the underlying land base,
enrollment or other core sovereign rights and interests.
II. ICRA Background and Congressional Policy
and Intent
Through a series of hearings spread over a nearly
eight-year period, Congress investigated the issue of
Indian civil rights. It included testimony from native and
non-Indian perspectives. A “broad picture of
constitutional neglect [emerged].”32 As summarized by
the Supreme Court:
“[Congress's] legislative
investigation revealed that . . . serious abuses of tribal
power had occurred in the administration of criminal
justice.”33 In the words of one senator who participated:
As the hearings developed and as the
evidence and testimony was taken, I
believe all of us who were students of the
law were jarred and shocked by the
conditions as far as constitutional rights
for members of the Indian tribes were
concerned. There was found to be
unchecked and unlimited authority over
many facets of Indian rights . . . The
Constitution simply was not applicable.34

32 Donald L. Burnett, Jr., An Historical Analysis of the 1968
‘Indian Civil Rights’ Act, 9 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 557, 577 (1972).
33 See Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 71.
34 113 Cong. Rec. 35,473 (1967) (statement of Sen. Roman L.
Hruska).
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In response to this realization, Congress exercised
its plenary power over Indian affairs and enacted the
Indian Civil Rights Act.35 A central purpose of ICRA was
to “‘secur[e] for the American Indian the broad
constitutional rights afforded to other Americans,’ and
thereby to ‘protect individual Indians from arbitrary and
unjust actions of tribal governments.’”36 Pursuant to this
objective, Congress granted individuals subjected to
tribal governmental action certain enumerated rights,
embracing for the most part the same protections
evidenced in the First, Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the Constitution.37
In enacting these provisions, Congress evinced an
intent to extend to members of tribes certain rights
against abuses by tribal officers and governments. Those
rights excluded from those protected by the U.S.
Constitutional Bill of Rights include the establishment
clause or separation of church and state, right to counsel
for indigent clients, the guarantee of a republican form of
25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-03, 1311-12, 1321-26 (2012). It was
“enacted as a rider to the Civil Rights Act of 1968.” Burnett,
supra note 32, at 557.
36 Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 61 (quoting S. Rep. No.
841, at 5–6 (1967)).
37 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (2016). They include the rights “to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, to be
confronted with the witnesses against him, to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses.” 25 U.S.C. §
1302(a)(6) (2012). It also guarantees “due process,” both
procedural and substantive, and equal protection under law,
grants a right to freedom of speech and assembly, and
prohibits the taking of land for public use without just
compensation. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1302(a)(1), 1302(a)(5), and
1302(a)(8).
35
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government, the right to a jury trial in civil cases, or the
right of indigent defendants appointed counsel in
criminal cases.38 As summarized in the Senate Report
accompanying the legislation:
Title II of the [Indian Civil Rights Act]
would grant to the American Indians
enumerated constitutional rights and
protection from arbitrary action in their
relationship with tribal governments,
state governments, and the Federal
government. Investigations have shown
that tribal members' basic constitutional
rights have been denied at every level.39
The rights encapsulated in § 1302 of ICRA must
be adhered to by tribal governments and their officials.
However, their enforcement is a key issue. Of course,
tribes may provide their own means of redress through
waivers of sovereign immunity and authorizing legal
action in tribal courts. However, violations may be the
basis for review in federal court under one and only one
grounds for relief: habeas corpus. § 1303 of the ICRA
provides: “The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall
be available to any person, in a court of the United
States, to test the legality of his detention by order of an
Indian tribe.”40 This language has been the subject of
much judicial interpretation.

38 The statute does provide a right to counsel at defendant’s
expense. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(6) (2016).
39 See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 841, at 10–11 (1968), reprinted in 1968
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1864.
40 25 U.S.C. § 1303 (2012).
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A. Early Interpretation and Enforcement of
ICRA
After its enactment, it was widely understood that
ICRA gave the federal courts broad powers to adjudicate
claims of civil rights violations by tribal officials and
governments.41 “The first case to interpret ICRA, Dodge
v. Nakai,” involved “the Navajo Tribe's exclusion from
tribal territory of a nonmember [] director of the
reservation's legal services program.”42 It did not present
a claim petition for writ of habeas corpus.43 Rather, “[t]he
Dodge court” based its jurisdictional authority upon
“statutes granting federal jurisdiction in controversies
involving federal questions, civil rights and writs of
mandamuses.”44 On the merits, it found that the Navajo
Tribal Council’s actions violated multiple provision
under ICRA.45 It held that the summary nature of the
exclusion order violated due process and violative of the
plaintiff’s right to freedom of speech:
This action . . . constitutes an abridgment
of free speech on the Navajo Reservation,
both the freedom of speech of the lawyer
who is representing his clients in a manner
deemed acceptable to his employer, and
41See

Robert Berry, Civil Liberties Restraints on Tribal
Sovereignty After the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 1 J.L.
& POL'Y 1, 23–27 (1993) (detailing the interpretations applied
by the courts during this time).
42 Id. at 23-24 (1993).
43 Id. at 24.
44 Id.
45 See id.
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the freedom of speech of the clients who
seek out that lawyer to act as their
spokesman in the community.46
The court held also that the exclusion order was a
legislative act effecting a punishment that violated
ICRA’s prohibition against a bill of attainder.47
For the first ten years following ICRA’s
enactment, most federal courts followed the Dodge
example, basing their authority in the federal
jurisdictional statutes that Dodge relied upon.48 They
construed ICRA as waiving sovereign immunity in the
context of alleged violations of its substantive provisions
and “turned their attention to the issue of how closely
interpretations of ICRA guarantees should parallel
interpretations
of
similar
constitutional
guarantees.”49 As summarized by the Tribal Law and
Policy Institute:
During the ten-year period from ICRA’s
passage to the Martinez decision, federal
courts heard approximately Eighty Cases
involving the application of the ICRA.
These cases covered many subjects: tribal
Dodge v. Nakai, 298 F. Supp. 26, 33 (D. Ariz. 1969).
Id. at 34.
48 See Berry, supra note 41, at 24.
49 Id. at 24-25 (1993) (discussing the history and interpretations of ICRA with respect to its impact on tribal
sovereignty, cautioning against proposals that would expand
ICRA’s enforceability in federal courts as diminishing tribal
sovereignty in favor of those that would increase funding to
tribal courts and the encouragement of intertribal courts of
appeals: “If Congress acts to widen the scope of federal
appeals
under
ICRA
it
may
well
diminish tribal sovereignty and gain only an empty victory
for civil liberties.” Id. at 30).
46
47
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election disputes, reapportionment of
voting districts on Indian reservations
("one man, one vote"), tribal government
employee rights; land use regulations and
condemnation procedures; criminal and
civil proceedings in tribal courts; tribal
membership and voting; tribal police
activities, conduct of tribal council
members and council meetings, and
standards for enforcing due process of law
and equal protection of the laws in tribal
settings.50
A number of interpretive guidelines emerged
during this time period, including that (1) the
substantive provisions need not be interpreted
identically to the Constitutional Bill of Rights, (2) tribal
custom, tradition and culture should be considered in
interpreting and applying ICRA; and (3) ICRA permits
different treatment between Indians and non-Indians in
some circumstances, i.e., with respect to tribal
The Indian Civil Rights Act, TRIBAL CT. CLEARINGHOUSE,
http://www.tribal-institute.org/lists/icra.htm [https://perma.
cc/DRX6-L6P6]. The specific cases are catalogued at Indian
Civil Rights Act Federal Court Cases 1968-1978, TRIBAL CT.
CLEARINGHOUSE,
http://www.tribal-institute.org/lists/icracases.htm [https://perma.cc/4DJ5-F8RA] [hereinafter Federal
Court Cases 1968-1978]; see also THE INDIAN CIVIL RIGHTS
ACT AT FORTY 167 (Kristen A. Carpenter et al. eds., 2012);
Angela R. Riley, Native Nations and the Constitution: An
Inquiry into “Extra-Constitutionality", 130 HARV. L. REV. F.
173, 182 (2017) (discussing the effect of the passage of the
ICRA).
50
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membership requirements.51
Even where physical
restraint was lacking, the courts intervened and
reviewed claims of rights violations. Jurisdiction in these
cases was premised on 28 U.S.C. § 1343 and 1331.52
B. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez
This trend abruptly changed, however, in 1978,
when the U. S. Supreme Court issued its Santa Clara
Pueblo decision, defining for the first time its
interpretation of the scope of federal remedial relief
intended by Congress in enacting ICRA. In Santa Clara
Pueblo, a female member of the tribe and her children
brought against the Santa Clara Pueblo and its governor
in federal court a civil suit under ICRA’s equal protection
provision,53 seeking declaratory and injunctive relief
against enforcement of a tribal ordinance that prohibited
“tribal membership to children of female members who
married outside the tribe but extend[ing] membership to

See Federal Court Cases 1968-1978, supra note 50. Many
courts also developed the rule that individuals should
generally exhaust tribal remedies prior to proceeding in
federal court. Id.
52 See, e.g., Howlett v. Salish and Kootenai Tribes of Flathead
Reservation, Montana, 529 F.2d 233, 236 (9th Cir. 1976)
(applying 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(4) (2012) which provides: “The
district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil
action authorized by law to be commenced by any person: (4)
To recover damages or to secure equitable or other relief
under any Act of Congress for the protection of civil rights,
including the right to vote.”).
53 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(8) (2012) (“No Indian tribe in exercising
powers of self-government shall . . . deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of its laws.”).
51
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the children of male members” who married outside the
tribe.54
In surveying the legal landscape in which the
matter was situated, the court began by reviewing
several primary tenets of tribal sovereignty. Specifically,
the Court focused on the tribe’s separate and
independent sovereign status that pre-dated the
constitution. Stated the court: “As separate sovereigns
pre-existing the Constitution, tribes have historically
been regarded as unconstrained by those constitutional
provisions framed specifically as limitations on federal or
state authority.” 55 It also noted Congress’ plenary power
to “to limit, modify or eliminate the powers of local selfgovernment which the tribes otherwise possess.”56
Acknowledged the Court: “Title I of the ICRA, 25 U.S.C.
§§ 1301–1303, represents an exercise of that authority.”57
Furthermore, ICRA’s enumerated rights in § 1302 clearly
modified the substantive law applicable to the tribe.58
The issue became whether ICRA implied a civil cause of
action for injunctive and declaratory relief to enforce the

Federal Court Cases 1968-1978, supra note 50; see also
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 52 n.2
(discussing the ordinance and the mechanism by which the
respondent’s children prevented from tribe membership).
55 Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 56 (citing Talton v Mayes,
163 U.S. 376 (1896)).
56 Id. at 56-57 (citing United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375,
at 379–381, 383–384 (1886); Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock,
187 U.S. 294, 305–307 (1902).
57 Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 57.
58 Id. at 58.
54
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provisions of § 1302, or whether Congress intended the
relief in § 1303 to be more narrow.59
Ultimately, the Court concluded the latter.60
Because of the well-established common law principle of
tribal sovereign immunity, like states, the federal
government and even foreign nations, tribes enjoy
sovereign immunity from civil suits as an inherent
attribute of sovereignty.61 However, sovereign immunity
is subject to waiver or Congressional abrogation.62 The
extent of Congress’ abrogation in ICRA was at issue in
Santa Clara Pueblo.63
See id.
See id. at 59 (holding that sovereign immunity protected
the tribe from the suit).
61 Andrea M. Seielstad, The Recognition and Evolution of
Tribal Sovereign Immunity Under Federal Law: Legal,
Historical, and Normative Reflections on a Fundamental
Aspect of American Indian Sovereignty, 37 TULSA L. REV.
661, 666 (2002). Since 2014, the author has also represented
petitioners in another ICRA case that has proceeded in the
tribal and appellate courts of the Bishop Paiute Tribe, the
federal district court, Eastern District of California, and the
9th Circuit. See Napoles v. Rogers, No. 16-cv-01933-DADJLT, 2017 WL 2930852 (E.D. Cal. 2017), aff’d, 743 F. App’x
136 (9th Cir. 2018). Squarely at issue in the federal portion of
the case is the scope of § 1303’s habeas provision and whether
the requisite conditions of “detention” sufficient to warrant
habeas exist. The following discussion about § 1303 and its
scope liberally draw from briefs submitted in that appeal.
Beyond this note, particular quotes and citations will not be
provided, and some passages may be verbatim.
62 Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 56-58; see also Michigan
v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty, 134 S.Ct. 2024, 2032 (2014)
(discussing the partial abrogation in the IGRA); United
States v. Oregon, 657 F.2d 1009, 1012–13 (9th Cir. 1981).
63 Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 56-58; see also Bay Mills
Indian Cmty., 134 S.Ct. at 2032; United States v. Oregon,
59
60
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Nothing in the plain language of ICRA, or the
legislative history, concluded the Court, indicated a
congressional intent to waive tribes’ sovereign immunity
except as provided to review a detention under § 1303’s
habeas provision.64 No suits for declaratory or injunctive
relief could be implied against the tribe; nor, could they
be applied against the governor, who was not protected
by tribal immunity. In reaching its conclusion about why
the governor could not be sued for injunctive and
declaratory relief, the Court pointed to congressional
language and legislative history that emphasized the
tribe’s interest
in self-government
and
selfdetermination:65
Given this history, it is highly unlikely that
Congress would have intended a private
cause of action for injunctive and
declaratory relief to be available in the
federal courts to secure enforcement of §
1302. Although the only Committee Report
on the ICRA in its final form, S. Rep. No.
657 F.2d 1009, 1013 (9th Cir. 1981). But see Dement v. Oglala
Sioux Tribal Court, 874 F.2d, 510, 515 (8th Cir. 1989). As
explained by the Eighth Circuit: “In [Santa Clara Pueblo],
the Supreme Court held that federal court enforcement of the
ICRA is limited to habeas corpus jurisdiction on behalf of
persons in tribal custody. Furthermore, the ICRA cannot be
directly enforced against Indian tribes because they are
shielded from suit by sovereign immunity. The Act, however,
may be enforced against officers of the tribe.” Id. (citing
Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 59).
64 Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 58-59.
65 Id. at 62-70.
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841, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967), sheds
little additional light on this question, it
would hardly support a contrary
conclusion. Indeed its description of the
purpose of Title I, as well as the
floor debates on the bill, indicates that the
ICRA was generally understood to
authorize federal judicial review of tribal
actions only through the habeas corpus
provisions of § 1303. These factors,
together with Congress' rejection of
proposals that clearly would have
authorized causes of action other than
habeas corpus, persuade us that Congress,
aware of the intrusive effect of federal
judicial
review
upon
tribal
selfgovernment, intended to create only a
limited mechanism for such review,
namely, that provided for expressly in §
1303.66
Thus, since Santa Clara Pueblo, federal courts
have been required to engage in the inquiry remaining
after Santa Clara Pueblo:
mainly, whether the
conditions sufficient to invoke federal jurisdiction under
§ 1303’s habeas provision exist. The way this should
happen and the scope of § 1303 was left to lower courts
to interpret since Santa Clara Pueblo.
One issue of debate is the extent to which
concerns for tribal sovereignty should be construed in the
analysis. The Supreme Court in Santa Clara Pueblo
elevated that concern to a counter-vailing policy concern.
As explained by the Supreme Court in Santa Clara
Pueblo: “In addition to its objective of strengthening the
66

Id. at 69-70 (footnotes and citing authority omitted).
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position of individual tribal members vis-à-vis the tribe,
Congress also intended to promote the well-established
federal
‘policy
of
furthering
Indian
self67
government.’” How and to what extent that should be
a factor, however, is a significant interpretive issue
moving forward; and, as set forth more fully below, it is
not something that the federal courts have sufficiently
articulated.
III. Federal Court Interpretation of Detention
under § 1303
The operative interpretive requirement for
federal review of tribal habeas cases, therefore, is that
there be circumstances constituting a detention. For
those whose rights have been violated by tribal action or
officials, only those individuals who are physically
detained to a level sufficient to invoke habeas relief may
seek federal enforcement of the substantive civil rights
guaranteed under ICRA. For those whose rights have
been violated but who have not been detained, remedies
exist only to the extent the offending tribal government
provides them.68
Id. at 62 (citing Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551
(1974)); see Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382, 391 (1976).
68 While some tribes provide for direct civil rights actions,
others do not. This is true also with respect to the extent to
which ICRA provisions may be enforced within tribal
criminal or quasi-criminal proceedings. Although details
about what is provided by way of ICRA enforcement within
tribal governments goes beyond the scope of this paper, a
number of scholars have made efforts to survey those
mechanisms. See, e.g., Klint A. Cowan, International
67
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It is important to note at the outset that the
determination of whether a substantive right has been
violated must be ascertained by the federal court once it
is determined there is jurisdiction, irrespective of the
particular right involved.69 Jurisdiction is determined
Responsibility for Human Rights Violations by American
Indian Tribes, 9 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 1, 41 (2006);
Robert J. Mccarthy, Civil Rights in Tribal Courts: The
Indian Bill of Rights at Thirty Years, 34 IDAHO L. REV. 465,
498-504 (1998); Eric Reitman, An Argument for the Partial
Abrogation of Federally Recognized Indian Tribes’ Sovereign
Power Over Membership, 92 VA. L. REV. 793, 818 (2006)
(internal citation omitted) (citing evidence that 2,000 tribal
members in California have been disenrolled from their
tribes without cause); John Yankovich, Without a Remedy:
The Effectiveness of the Indian Civil Rights Act, LAW J. FOR
SOC. SCI. (Apr. 29, 2015), https://lawjournalforsocialjustice.
com/2015/04/29/without-a-remedy-the-effectiveness-of-theindian-civil-rights-act/ [https://perma.cc/SL49-P5FV];
Harold Monteau, Indian Civil Rights Act Has Done Nothing
for Individual Indians’ Rights, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY (July
2,2012), https://newsmaven.io/indiancountrytoday/archive/i
ndian-civil-rights-act-has-done-nothing-for-individualindians-rights-b4W71ciTcEi98TDOUMkwuA/ (citing case
where a tribal member was denied counsel, prosecutor acted
as defense counsel, and tribe failed to read charges against
him until day of trial) [https://perma.cc/4ZJZ-57AA]; Tom
Robertson, Tribal Justice – But Not for All, MINN. PUB. RADIO
(April 2001), http://news.minnesota.publicradio.org/projects/
2001/04/brokentrust/robertsont_tribaljustice-m/index.shtml
(reporting claims by tribal members of exclusion from
reservation without any hearing, lack of separation of powers
between judicial, legislative and executive branches of tribal
government, leading to injustices) [https://perma.cc/P5J5FA79]].
69 This is important clarification because this point
sometimes gets improperly conflated in the jurisdictional
analysis. For example, in Napoles v. Rogers, the district court
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solely by whether and to what extent a detention has
occurred sufficient for invoking federal habeas review
under ICRA’s § 1303 and interpretative case law.70
Section 1302 clearly modifies the substantive law
applicable to the tribes.71 The merits of the substantive
rights violations are a separate evidentiary stage in the
life of a habeas action.72 If there is jurisdiction, the court
then must ascertain the merits of whether a rights
violation occurred and determine what remedies to
impose. That is a separate inquiry that must be
undertaken by the federal court once the jurisdiction for
habeas is established.
Also distinct from the issue of jurisdiction is the
actual relief that may be granted through habeas.
Discharge from custody, of course, is essential in habeas.
However, it is not the only remedy that has historically

dismissed the habeas petition, in part, because of a belief that
there was no authority under “§ 1303 [that] gives federal
courts sitting in habeas the jurisdiction to resolve intra-tribal
land ownership disputes.” Napoles v. Rogers, No. 16-cv01933-DAD-JLT, 2017 WL 2930852, at *11 (9th Cir. Nov. 21,
2018), aff’d, 743 Fed.Appx. 136 (9th Cir. 2018). ICRA does,
however, prohibit tribes from taking land for public use
without just compensation and has a due process clause as
well. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1302(a)(5), (a)(8) (2012). The court,
therefore, would first have to determine whether petitioners
had been “detained” under § 1303. Then, they would have to
make findings about the alleged substantive violations,
including those that involved land or takings.
70 Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 57-58.
71 Id. at 59.
72 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (2012); 20 AM. JUR. TRIALS 1D Federal
Habeas Corpus Practice §§ 28-51 (1973).
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been granted.73 Habeas corpus has been used to dismiss
charges, order new trials or appellate process, direct
appointment of counsel, remedy cruel or inhuman
conditions of confinement.74 Even if unconditionally
released
by
custodial
authorities
from
an
unconstitutional confinement after the filing of a petition
for habeas corpus, a person “may nevertheless be
afforded relief in the nature of a declaratory judgment
that his conviction was void, in order to remove the
stigma and disabilities that would otherwise attach by
reason of his conviction.”75
A. Habeas Under § 1303
To invoke federal habeas relief under the ICRA,
one whose rights under ICRA have been violated
necessarily must establish a detention or, “a severe
actual or potential restraint on liberty.”76 Actual
imprisonment, of course, is the most fundamental basis
for habeas jurisdiction. The precise circumstances in
which that standard is met beyond imprisonment,
however, has been a primary focus of judicial decisionmaking in cases interpreting ICRA as well as the other
federal habeas statutes requiring a petitioner to be “in
custody.”77 Outside of the ICRA context, as discussed in
detail below, it has been widely acknowledged that actual
physical imprisonment is not a jurisdictional
20 AM. JUR. TRIALS 1D Federal Habeas Corpus Practice §
52 (1973) (“the notion that the only relief available is
discharge from custody has been abandoned by the Supreme
Court.”).
74 Id. § 55.
75 Id. (citing Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234 (1968)).
76 Poodry v. Tonawanda Band of Seneca Indians, 85 F.3d 874,
880 (2d Cir. 1996).
77 See, e.g., id.
73
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prerequisite to habeas review.78 With respect to ICRA,
however, the federal courts have not embraced a
universal view of the scope of ICRA’s “detention”
requirement. The majority of the federal circuits have
determined that the “[t]erm ‘detention’ [used in the
ICRA] must be interpreted similarly to the ‘in custody’
requirement in other habeas contexts.”79 As described in
more detail below, the Ninth Circuit and some lower
courts, however, have suggested that the scope under
ICRA is actually narrower.
B. Scope of Custody in the Context of State
and Federal Action
“In England, as in the United States, the chief use
of habeas corpus has been to seek the release of persons
held in actual, physical custody in prison or jail.”80
However, the remedy also served to provide judicial
review in other situations limiting individuals’ liberty.
In Hensley v. Municipal Court, the Supreme Court
explained:
The custody requirement of the habeas
statute is designed to preserve the writ of
habeas corpus as a remedy for severe
restraints on individual liberty. Since
habeas corpus is an extraordinary remedy
whose operation is to a large extent
uninhibited by traditional rules of finality
See Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 240 (1963).
Jeffredo v. Macarro, 599 F.3d 913, 918 (9th Cir. 2010)
(citing Moore v. Nelson, 270 F.3d 789, 791 (9th Cir. 2001)).
80 Jones, 371 U.S. at 238.
78
79
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and federalism, its use had been limited to
cases of special urgency, leaving more
conventional remedies for cases in which
the restraints on liberty are neither severe
nor immediate.81
In Jones v. Cunningham, the Supreme Court also
stated: “History, usage, and precedent can leave no doubt
that, besides physical imprisonment, there are other
restraints on a man’s liberty, restraints that are not
shared by the public generally, which have been thought
sufficient in the English-speaking world to support the
issuance of habeas corpus.”82 Jones was a case in which
an individual used habeas to challenge the conditions of
parole, and the court acknowledged that parole could be
grounds for habeas, depending on the conditions and
consequences upon violating it.83 In Jones, the Supreme
Court detailed a number of examples that “show clearly
that English courts have not treated the Habeas Corpus
Act of 1679, 31 Car. II, c. 2—the forerunner of all habeas
corpus acts—as permitting relief only to those in jail or
like physical confinement.”84 For example, it was noted
that the English courts provided remedies in habeas to
question whether a woman alleged to be the applicant's
wife was being constrained by her guardians to stay away
from her husband against her will since she was not “at
her liberty to go where she please(d).”85 Relief in habeas
corpus was also held to be appropriate for an indentured
Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345, 351 (1973).
Jones, 371 U.S. at 240.
83 Id. at 243.
84 Id. at 239.
85 Id. at 239-40 (citing Rex v. Clarkson (1722) 93 Eng. Rep.
625; 1 Str. 444 (K.B.) (holding that the test for habeas was
simply whether she was “at her liberty to go where she
please(d)”)).
81
82
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18-year-old girl who had been assigned by her master to
another man “for bad purposes” as well as for a parent to
obtain his children from the other parent despite the fact
that the children were not “not under imprisonment,
restraint, or duress of any kind.”86
Similar examples were noted by the Court
regarding habeas in the United States. For example,
courts have widely held that habeas corpus is available
to aliens seeking entry into the United States, even
though they were free to go elsewhere in the world.87 It
has also been regarded as the appropriate procedural
method of questioning the legality of enlistment or
induction into the military.88 And, as in English courts,
habeas has been repeatedly used in state courts by
parents disputing over custody of their children.89
Jones, 371 U.S. at 239 (internal citations omitted).
Jones, 371 U.S. at 239 (citing Brownell v. Tom We Shung,
352 U.S. 180, 183 (1956); Shaughnessy v. United States ex
rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 213 (1953) (explaining that, even
though the he was free to go anywhere else, “his movements
are restrained by authority of the United States, and he may
by habeas corpus test the validity of his exclusion”); United
States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 551
(1950); United States v. Jung Ah Lung, 124 U.S. 621, 626
(1888)).
88 See, e.g., Ex parte Fabiani, 105 F. Supp. 139, 144 (E.D. Pa.
1952); United States ex rel. Steinberg v. Graham, 57 F. Supp.
938, 942 (E.D. Ark. 1944).
89 Jones, 371 U.S. at 240 (citing Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187
(1962); Boardman v. Boardman, 135 Conn. 124, 138
(1948); Barlow v. Barlow, 141 Ga. 535, 536—37 (1914); In re
Swall, 36 Nev. 171, 174 (1913) (“the question of physical
restraint need be given little or no consideration where a
lawful right is asserted to retain possession of the child”)); see
86
87
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It is thus well established with respect to the
federal
“in
custody”
requirement
that
actual physical custody
is
not
a
jurisdictional
prerequisite for federal habeas review. Explains the
Supreme Court:
Of course, [the] writ always could and still
can reach behind prison walls and iron
bars. But it can do more. It is not now and
never
has
been
a
static,
narrow, formalistic remedy; its scope has
grown to achieve its grand purpose—the
protection of individuals against erosion of
their right to be free from wrongful
restraints upon their liberty.90
What is critical under the precedent of federal
habeas law is that the restrictive government action
create an onerous physical and geographical constraint
of “special urgency,” or even threat of it under supervised
control.91 Also emphasized has been the idea that the
petitioners’ court- or government-ordered or imposed
restraints be “not shared by the public generally.”92 In
summary, custody for the purposes of habeas corpus
relief involves “severe restraints on [a person's]

also In re Hollopeter, 52 Wash. 41, 43 (1909) (holding that the
husband was entitled to release of his wife from restraint by
her parents); Ex parte Chace, 26 R.I. 351, 358 (1904) (holding
that the wife was entitled to husband's society free of
restraint by his guardian).
90 Jones, 371 U.S. at 243 (emphasis added).
91 Hensley v. San Jose Dist. Mun. Court, 411 U.S. 345, 351
(1973).
92 Id. (quoting Jones, 371 U.S. at 240).
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individual liberty,”93 even restraints that fall “outside
conventional notions of physical custody.”94
As a result of this broad and historically-derived
understanding of habeas, federal habeas jurisdiction has
been established in a wide array of diverse
circumstances. Historically, as indicated above,
“[c]onfinement under civil and criminal process . . . Wives
restrained by husbands, children withheld from the
proper parent or guardian, persons held under arbitrary
custody by private individuals . . . as well as those under
military control may all become proper subjects of relief
by the writ of habeas corpus.”95
With respect to matters implicating judicial
action, situations have included orders of personal
recognizance,96 probation,97 suspended sentences
carrying a threat of future imprisonment,98 a
requirement to appear in court and not depart the state

Hensley, 411 U.S. at 351.
Edmunds v. Won Bae Chang, 509 F.2d 39, 40 (9th Cir.
1975).
95 Wales v. Whitney, 114 U.S. 564, 571 (1885).
96 Hensley, 411 U.S. at 351.
97 United States ex rel. B. v. Shelly, 430 F.2d 215, 217–18 n.3
(2d Cir. 1970).
98 Sammons v. Rodgers, 785 F.2d 1343, 1345 (5th Cir. 1986)
(per curiam).
93
94
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without permission,99 and an order to attend alcohol
counseling.100
Habeas relief also has been held to be central to
challenges of executive detention as well, during times of
war as well as peace. For example, the Supreme Court
has entertained habeas petitions of admitted enemy
aliens convicted of war crimes during a declared war and
held in the United States101 and its insular
possessions,102 and of an American citizen who planned
an attack on military installations during the Civil
War.103 Neither citizenship nor territoriality have been
determined to be essential to the exercise of the writ.
Most recently, the Court determined that foreign citizens
captured and transported to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba to
be detained were eligible to have their constitutional
claims reviewed under habeas.104 The degree of dominion
and control exercised by the United States was sufficient
to trigger habeas jurisdiction, irrespective of the fact that

Justices of Bos. Mun. Court. v. Lydon, 466 U.S. 294, 301
(1984) (holding that an obligation to appear in court and
requirement that petitioner not depart the state without the
court's leave demonstrated the existence of restraints on the
petitioner's personal liberty “not shared by the public
generally”).
100 See also Dow v. Court of the First Circuit, 995 F.2d 922,
923 (9th Cir. 1993) (per curiam) (holding that a requirement
to attend fourteen hours of alcohol rehabilitation constituted
“custody” because requiring petitioner’s physical presence at
a particular place “significantly restrain[ed] [his] liberty to do
those things which free persons in the United States are
entitled to do.”).
101 Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1942).
102 In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1946).
103 Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 10 (1866).
104 Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 480 (2004).
99
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ultimate territorial sovereignty remained that of Cuba.105
This case has particular applicability in the tribal context
to the extent Indian tribes remain dependent sovereign
nations under the ultimate authority and trusted
responsibility of the United States. So, too, do the cases
striking down denaturalization orders of United States
citizens as a punishment for military desertion or other
misconduct.106
Id. at 482 (illuminating how the scope of the present day
habeas remedy is rooted in the common law: “Later cases
confirmed that the reach of the writ depended not on formal
notions of territorial sovereignty, but rather on the practical
question of ‘the exact extent and nature of the jurisdiction or
dominion exercised in fact by the Crown.’” (citing Ex parte
Mwenya, [1960] 1 QB 241 at 303 (C.A)).
106 See, e.g., Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 92–93 (1958)
(reversing as unconstitutional a denial of a passport because
a citizen’s citizenship was revoked in a court martial
proceeding as a punishment for military desertion:
“Citizenship is not a license that expires upon misbehavior.
The duties of citizenship are numerous, and the discharge of
many of these obligations is essential to the security and wellbeing of the Nation. . . In time of war the citizen's duties
include not only the military defense of the Nation but also a
full participation in the manifold activities of the civilian
ranks. Failure to perform any of these obligations may cause
the Nation serious injury, and, in appropriate circumstances,
the punishing power is available to deal with derelictions of
duty. But citizenship is not lost every time a duty of
citizenship is shirked. And the deprivation of citizenship is
not a weapon that the Government may use to express its
displeasure at a citizen's conduct, however reprehensible that
conduct may be. As long as a person does not voluntarily
renounce or abandon his citizenship, and this petitioner has
done neither, I believe his fundamental right of citizenship is
105
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C. Detention Under ICRA’s § 1303
Federal courts have interpreted ICRA’s
“detention” in a variety of contexts, creating
opportunities to examine the scope of congressional
definition of the term. There is virtually unanimous
agreement that “a severe actual or potential restraint on
liberty” is necessary for jurisdiction under § 1303.107 A
relatively minor point of departure has emerged in their
interpretation of the scope of that requirement –
specifically, with respect to whether the concept of
“detention” in § 1303 was intended to be interpreted the
same as that of the “in custody” requirement of the other
federal habeas statutes.
The majority of circuits and district courts have
agreed that though “actual physical custody is not
necessarily a jurisdictional requirement for habeas
secure. On this ground alone the judgment in this case should
be reversed.”); Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601, 611–
12 (1949) (revoking citizenship is “an extraordinarily severe
penalty” with consequences that “may be more grave than
consequences that flow from conviction for crimes. The
Second Circuit cited both of these cases and their rationales
in holding permanent banishment of tribal members to
constitution a “detention” under ICRA’s habeas provision.
Poodry, 85 F.3d at 895-96.
107 See Poodry, 85 F.3d at 880; see also Jeffredo v. Macarro,
599 F.3d 913, 919 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Poodry, 85 F.3d at
880 for the proposition that “§ 1303 does require ‘a severe
actual or potential restraint on liberty’” and showing that the
Ninth Circuit has embraced this standard as well); Tavares
v. Whitehouse, 851 F.3d 863, 879 (9th Cir. 2017) (Wardlaw,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Shenandoah v.
Halbritter, 275 F. Supp. 2d 279, 285 (N.D.N.Y. 2003) (quoting
Poodry for the same proposition as in Jeffredo, 599 F.3d at
919).
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review,” the “[t]erm ‘detention’ [used in the ICRA] must
be interpreted similarly to the ‘in custody’ requirement
in other habeas contexts.”108 However, selected judicial
decisions have suggested a distinction between
“detention” and “custody.” In Tavares v. Whitehouse, the
Ninth Circuit suggested that, at least in the context of
that case, “detention” under § 1303 was a subset of
“custody” and, hence, more narrow in scope.109 Finding
that a temporary exclusion from tribal lands and services
was insufficient to warrant federal habeas jurisdiction,
the court stated:
“We view Congress's choice of
‘detention’ rather than ‘custody’ in § 1303 as a
meaningful restriction on the scope of habeas
jurisdiction under the ICRA . . . But to the extent that the
statute is ambiguous, we construe it in favor of tribal
sovereignty.”110 In rendering that determination, the
Jeffredo, 599 F.3d at 918 (citing Moore v. Nelson, 270 F.3d
789, 791 (9th Cir. 2001)); Scudero v. Moran, 230 F. Supp. 3d
980, 984 (D. Alaska 2017) (citing Jeffredo, 599 F.3d at 918
(9th Cir. 2010); see Valenzuela v. Silversmith, 699 F.3d 1199,
1203 (10th Cir. 2012) (holding that “[t]he ‘detention’ language
in § 1303 is analogous to the ‘in custody’ requirement
contained in the [other] federal habeas statute[s].” (quoting
Walton v. Tesuque Pueblo, 443 F.3d 1274, 1279 n.1 (10th Cir.
2006))).
109 Tavares, 851 F.3d at 871, cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 1323
(2018) (stating the argument which was the basis for Tavares’
petitioners’ appeal to the Supreme Court); see Petition for
Writ of Certiorari, Tavares, 2017 WL 4251148 (No. 17-429);
see also Brief for Seielstad as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents, Tavares v. Whitehouse, 138 S. Ct. 1323 (2018)
(No. 17-429), 2018 WL 1460776.
110 Tavares, 851 F.3d at 876–77 (citing Merck & Co. v.
Reynolds, 559 U.S. 633, 648 (2010); Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd.,
108
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court presumes without actual analysis that the
sovereign interests are best secured by declining
jurisdiction based upon what it characterized as a
temporary exclusion of petitioners from tribal lands and
services.
It is yet unclear how the Ninth Circuit will
proceed in future cases that implicate the scope of § 1303.
The detention/custody distinction is counter to other
well-established Ninth Circuit precedent as well as that
of every other circuit that has examined the issue. As
determined by the Ninth Circuit in another of its cases:
“The term ‘detention’ in the [ICRA] statute must be
interpreted similarly to the ‘in custody’ requirement in
other habeas contexts.”111 The decisions of the Tenth
Circuit have similarly rejected this contention.112 So, too,
have the Third and Sixth Circuits.113
Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue, 458 U.S. 832, 846 (1982); COHEN’S
HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 2.02(1), at 113 (2017)).
111 Jeffredo, 599 F.3d at 918; see also Boozer v. Wilder, 381
F.3d 931, 934 n.2 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Detention [as used in 25
U.S.C. § 1303] is interpreted with reference to custody under
other federal habeas provisions.”); Moore v. Nelson, 270 F.3d
789, 791 (9th Cir. 2001) (“There is no reason to conclude that
the requirement of ‘detention’ set forth in the Indian Civil
Rights Act § 1303 is any more lenient than the requirement
of ‘custody’ set forth in the other habeas statutes.” (citing
Poodry v. Tonawanda, 85 F.3d 874, 891 (2nd Cir. 1996))).
112 See, e.g., Poodry, 85 F.3d at 880; see also Valenzuela v.
Silversmith, 699 F.3d 1199, 1203 (10th Cir. 2012) (“We have
recognized that the ‘detention’ language in §1303 is
analogous to the ‘in custody’ requirement contained in the
other federal habeas statutes.”); Dry v. CFR Court of Indian
Offenses for Choctaw Nation, 168 F.3d 1207, 1208 n.1 (10th
Cir. 1999).
113 See, e.g., Kelsey v. Pope, 809 F.3d 849, 854 (6th Cir. 2016)
(“[H]abeas claims brought under the Indian Civil Rights Act,
25 U.S.C. §1303, are most similar to habeas actions arising
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The Tavares majority deviates from this
precedent and the language used by Congress in its
various habeas statutes in its suggestion that “detention”
and “in custody” are used distinctively between tribal
and state or federal systems. As noted by the dissent, the
terms “detention” and “in custody” are used
interchangeably in the precedents on habeas.114 For
instance, in a non-ICRA case the Third Circuit relied on
the Second Circuit’s analysis of “detention” in ICRA in
support of its holding that a person sentenced to perform
five hundred hours of community service was “in
custody.”115 The Tavares majority also suggests that the
use of the word “detention” in § 1303 is significant
because, by contrast, the word “custody” is used in “every
§” of federal habeas statutes 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c)(1)–
(4), 2254(a), and 2255(a).116 However, in actuality, the
word “custody” does not appear in every habeas
statute.117 The word “detention” also appears frequently
in most sections of the federal habeas statutes.118 There
under 28 U.S.C. §2241”) (citing Poodry, 85 F.3d at 890–91);
Barry v. Bergen Cty. Prob. Dep’t, 128 F.3d 152, 160–61 (3d
Cir. 1997) (relying, without citing, on the Poodry analysis of
“detention” under ICRA in analyzing “in custody” under
§2254(a)).
114 Tavares, 851 F.3d at 880 (Wardlaw, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
115 Id.; see also Barry, 128 F.3d at 161.
116 Tavares, 851 F.3d at 880 (Wardlaw, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
117 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2245, 2249, 2253 (referring to “detention”
only).
118 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241, 2242, 2243, 2244, 2255
(2012) (referring to both “detention” and “custody,”
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is no indication in any part of any section that the terms
might have distinct meanings; if anything, the statutes
suggest, as a whole, that “detention” and “custody” are
interchangeable. As explained convincingly by the
Second Circuit:
We find the choice of language
unremarkable in light of references to
“detention” in the federal statute
authorizing a motion attacking a federal
sentence, see § 2255, as well as in the
procedural
provisions
accompanying §2241, see §§2242, 2243, 22
44(a), 2245, 2249, 2253. Congress appears
to use the terms “detention” and “custody”
interchangeably in the habeas context. We
are therefore reluctant to attach great
weight to Congress's use of the word
“detention” in § 1303.119
The legislative history similarly does not support
a finding of a distinction between the two terms, surely
not one limiting the concept in the tribal context. In fact,
as accurately pointed out by the dissent in Tavares, the
language used in § 1303, “legality of the detention of an
Indian,” is the same language used in the case of
Colliflower v. Garland.120 Colliflower is significant
because it was referenced in the legislative history
leading to the enactment of ICRA and provided the basis

interchangeably); cf. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2252, 2254 (2012)
(referring to “custody” only).
119 Poodry, 85 F.3d at 890–91.
120 Colliflower v. Garland, 342 F.2d 369, 371 (9th Cir. 1965),
overruled by United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978);
see Davis v. Muellar, 643 F.2d 521, 532 n.13 (8th Cir. 1981).
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for Congress’ understanding of tribal detention orders. 121
It was natural, therefore, for Congress to use its wording
when seeking to clarify whether habeas review or direct
appeal and de novo trial of criminal cases would apply
under ICRA.122

Specifically, in Senate Bill 962, the bill that initially
authorized appeals of tribal court criminal convictions to
federal court with trials de novo on appeal, Senator Erwin
identified Colliflower as “forward thinking” and
recommended that its standard review under habeas corpus
be applied to all tribal court decisions, whether or not the
tribal court functioned as a creation of the Bureau of Indian
Affairs or were governed by the BIA’s model code. Burnett,
supra note 32, at 592 n.201, 592–93. As the Second Circuit
acknowledged: Congress “frequently invoked [Colliflower]
with approval during the 1965 [Subcommittee on
Constitutional Rights of the Senate Judiciary Committee]
hearings” that preceded the ICRA's enactment, indicating an
intent for the ICRA's habeas provision to be as broad as, but
“no broader than,” its federal counterparts. See Poodry, 85
F.3d at 891, 893 (internal citations omitted); see also Tavares,
851 F.3d at 881, n.4 (Wardlaw, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part) (“My point is not that Colliflower is
authoritative precedent for the exact issue before us. If it
were, such a lengthy decision would be unnecessary. But
given that there is, as the majority opinion notes, little other
legislative history for us to consider, Colliflower is relevant
because it apparently guided Congress's understanding that
the habeas provision it was enacting within ICRA would be
as broad as the federal habeas statutes that had long been
part of the nation's laws. The majority opinion does not
respond to this point.” (internal citation omitted)).
122 Tavares, 851 F.3d at 881 (Wardlaw, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part).
121
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After careful analysis of the particular Indian
court in place in Colliflower, most notably that it was a
creature of the federal government, the Ninth Circuit
held that “it is competent for a federal court in a habeas
corpus proceeding to inquire into the legality of the
detention of an Indian pursuant to an order of an Indian
court.”123 The main point of the analysis, in fact, was that
the tribal court involved in Colliflower that issued the
relevant order was an Indian court created by and still
operating under the authority of the federal government
– an extension of federally exercised jurisdiction,
therefore. A careful reading of the case and discussion of
the case in ICRA’s legislative history, therefore, reveals
a congressional intent to render ICRA’s habeas
provisions to be identical in scope to its federal
counterparts.124 The best interpretation of ICRA in light
of Colliflower was that Congress was clarifying that
habeas could be used to test the legality in federal court
of tribal court orders, whether a creature of the federal
government or the tribe’s own inherent sovereignty, to
the extent permitted the federal habeas statutes that
apply to state or federal action.
In short, there really is no basis for the
proposition that “detention” for the purposes of habeas in
Colliflower, 342 F.2d at 379.
Poodry, 85 F.3d at 891 (citing Hearings on S. 961–968 and
S.J. Res. 40 Before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights
of the Senate Judiciary Committee, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1965) at 2, 24–25, 66–67, 91–92, 95, 220, 227 ( hereinafter
“1965 Senate Hearings ”); Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
Summary Report of Hearings and Investigations Pursuant to
S. Res. 194, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966) (hereinafter “1966
Summary Report ”) at 13; Rights of Members of Indian Tribes:
Hearing on H.R. 15419 and Related Bills Before the
Subcommittee on Indian Affairs of the House Committee on
Interior and Insular Affairs, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968) at
47, 112-13 (hereinafter “1968 House Hearing ”)).
123
124
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ICRA should be more narrowly construed than that
required in federal or state courts, and Tavares is out of
step with other opinions of the Ninth Circuit as well as
the uncontroverted decisions in all other federal
circuits.125
D. Applicability of ICRA’s Habeas Provision
It is sometimes argued that habeas applies only
in the context of criminal proceedings. This argument
was carefully mapped out and refuted by the Second
Circuit in Poodry v. Tolawanda Band.126 Proponents of
this argument pointed to language in Santa Clara Pueblo
describing habeas review as the exclusive vehicle for
“federal-court review of tribal criminal proceedings.”127
Additional support has been construed from the fact that
the first set of Indian rights bills, introduced in 1964 and
125See

Tavares, 851 F.3d at 866–67 (distinguishing
“detention” and “custody”). Indeed, these arguments were
made in the appeal to the Ninth Circuit in Napoles as well as
the petition for certiorari filed to the Supreme Court in the
Tavares case. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 11–20,
Tavares v. Whitehouse, 138 S. Ct. 1323 (2018) (No. 17-429);
Brief Amicus Curiae of the Goldwater Institute in Support of
Petitioner at 13, Tavares v. Whitehouse, 138 S. Ct. 1323
(2018) (No. 17-429) (“ICRA’s habeas review provision is
broader than federal habeas.”); Opening Brief for Appellant
at 22–27, Napoles v. Rogers, 743 F. App’x 136 (9th Cir. 2018)
(No. 17-16620).
126 Poodry, 85 F.3d at 887–89 (although, because the court
found the sanction in Poodry to be “criminal,” the court did
not ultimately decide the extent to which “civil” sanctions
would qualify for habeas review. See id. at 888).
127 Id. at 886 (citing Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 67).
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1965, would have permitted the direct appeal to federal
district court of any conviction “in any criminal action
hereafter commenced in an Indian court.” 128 Finally,
some meaning was construed from an opinion in the
context of state habeas regarding habeas over child
custody proceedings wherein habeas jurisdiction was
rejected for being outside of state court criminal
convictions
resulting
in
substantial
physical
129
constraints.
Notwithstanding
these
arguments,
“[t]he
relevance of [the distinction between civil and criminal
proceedings]”130 is not easily borne out by the language
of § 1303, which defines “detention by order of
an Indian tribe” as the sole jurisdictional prerequisite for
federal habeas review and does not explicitly limit its
scope to the criminal context.131 The legislative history of
ICRA supports this conclusion as well. The final bill
emerged from consideration of several previous bills.
While one expressly referenced criminal proceedings, the
others were more broad in scope; nothing in the bill
language indicated an intent to limit the provision
explicitly and exclusively to criminal proceedings.132
Poodry, 85 F.3d at 887–88 (citing S. 962, 89th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1965) (emphasis added)); see also S. 1843, 90th Cong.,
1st Sess. § 201(a), 113 CONG. REC. 13,474 (1967); S. 3048,
88th Cong., 2d Sess., 110 CONG. REC. 17,329 (1964).
129 Poodry, 85 F.3d at 887 (citing Lehman v. Lycoming Cty.
Children's Serv., 458 U.S. 502 (1982)).
130 Id.
131 Tavares, 851 F.3d at 871.
132 ICRA's habeas provision appeared in the original S. 1843
in addition to remedial relief in the form of direct appeal of
convictions in criminal actions. See S. 1843, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess. § 103, 113 CONG. REC 13,474 (1967). The direct appeal
option was removed from the final version, however. Because
the original S. 1843 contained both direct appeals of criminal
convictions and habeas relief, “it is not accurate to say that
128
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Moreover, the congressional hearings on the statute
clearly reveal a concern for matters other
than criminal.133 In the words of the Second Circuit: “To
put the matter simply: it is not possible to draw from
[ICRA’s] legislative history a definitive conclusion as to
whether Congress intended that habeas review be
restricted to criminal convictions, or whether other
circumstances of ‘detention’ by a tribal court order could
trigger habeas review.”134 Nor did the Supreme Court in
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez speak to the scope of
ICRA’s habeas provision in such a manner.135
Courts addressing the issue have looked to the
punitive and restrictive nature of the sanctions or
conduct leading to the request for habeas relief
irrespective of whether it was classified as criminal per
the habeas provision replaced the section permitting a direct
appeal; the latter was simply eliminated.” Poodry, 85 F.3d at
888. The Senate Judiciary Committee Report discussing the
removal of the direct appeal section, moreover, does not
illuminate a specific reason for doing so. See S. REP. NO. 841,
90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
133 See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 15419, 15122, S. 1843 Before a
Subcomm. of Indian Affairs of the Comm. on Interior and
Insular Affairs, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968); see also Solomon
v. La Rose, 335 F. Supp. 715, at 718–21 (D. Neb. 1971)
(discussing the deprivation of Indian rights in matters of
religion, taxation, free speech and tribal membership as well
as in criminal proceedings). This is borne out also by the final
legislative inclusion of such freedoms as well as the
prohibition against the taking of property without due
process or for a public use without just compensation. 25
U.S.C. § 1302 (2012).
134 Poodry, 85 F.3d at 888.
135 Id. at 887 (citing Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 67).
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se.136 Some explicitly have held, even in the absence of
formal criminal prosecutions, that banishment and even
disenrollment by tribal council action constitute a

In Hensley v. Municipal Court, the Supreme Court
determined federal habeas review to be invoked by an order
of personal recognizance requiring petitioner to appear at
times and places as ordered by any court or magistrate and
other restraints “not shared by the public generally.” 411 U.S.
at 351 (quoting Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 240).
A number of other cases have held habeas to be the
appropriate remedy for other forms of judicial
superintendence and control. See, e.g., Justices of Boston
Mun. Court v. Lydon, 466 U.S. 294, 301 (1984) (holding that
the obligation to appear in court and the requirement that
petitioner not depart the state without the court's leave
demonstrated the existence of restraints on the petitioner's
personal liberty “not shared by the public generally”) (quoting
Hensley, 411 U.S. at 351); Sammons v. Rodgers, 785 F.2d
1343, 1345 (5th Cir.1986) (per curiam) (holding that a
suspended sentence carrying a threat of future imprisonment
was sufficient for habeas review); United States ex rel. B. v.
Shelly, 430 F.2d 215, 217–18 n.3 (2d Cir. 1970) (holding that
probation can give rise to a non-frivolous habeas petition).
The Ninth Circuit has held that that a requirement to attend
fourteen hours of alcohol rehabilitation constituted “custody”
because requiring petitioner’s physical presence at a
particular place “significantly restrain[ed] [his] liberty to do
those things which free persons in the United States are
entitled to do.” Dow v. Circuit Court of the First Circuit, 995
F.2d 922, 923 (9th Cir. 1993) (per curiam); see also Durbin v.
California, 720 F.3d 1095, 1096 (9th Cir. 2013) (recognizing
validity of habeas petition to challenge parole term of only
two years); Barry v. Bergen Cty. Prob. Dep’t, 128 F.3d 152,
160–61 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding that a sentence to 500 hours
of community service met the requirement).
136
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punitive sanction sufficient to implicate ICRA’s habeas
provision.137 As explained by the district court in Quair:
The court concludes that the disenrollment
of a tribal member and the banishment of
that tribal member constitutes a punitive
sanction irregardless (sic) of the
underlying circumstances leading to those
decisions. The Supreme Court has noted
that banishment historically has been
considered a punitive sanction. Therefore,
even if the circumstances leading to
imposition of the sanction are not
considered criminal conduct per
se, the
imposition of that sanction renders those
proceedings criminal for
purposes
of
habeas corpus relief.138
IV. Diverse Contexts Interpreting “Detention”
Requirement
Since the Supreme Court’s decision in Santa
Clara Pueblo in 1978, there have been a significant
number of cases brought in federal court under ICRA. Of
those that have been brought, only a few have been
successful on the merits, or even reached the merits.139
See, e.g., Quair v. Sisco, 359 F. Supp. 2d 948, 967 (2004);
Poodry, 85 F.3d at 879 (concluding that the circumstances of
banishment constituted criminal conduct sufficient for the
purposes of a writ of habeas corpus).
138 Quair, 359 F. Supp. 2d at 967.
139 Of the long list of cases referenced in the next sections,
habeas relief has been granted in two banishment cases, see,
e.g., Poodry, 85 F.3d at 879; Sweet v. Hinzman, 634 F. Supp.
137
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Section 1303’s jurisdictional requirement and the
doctrine of exhaustion have weeded out most claims.
Nonetheless, it is instructive to analyze the claims that
have been brought. The contexts of the claims may be
grouped into a number of categories based on the
circumstances underlying each petition:
those
articulating that a detention occurred (1) through actual
incarceration, (2) the supervisory control exerted by the
tribal court or other tribal entity, (3) through the
circumstances giving rise to banishment and other forms
of physical and geographical ejectment and restraint,

2d 1196, 1200 (W.D. Wash. 2008), one anomalous land case
brought by a private business entity not a member to any
tribe, see, e.g., Dry Creek Lodge, Inc. v. Arapahoe and
Shoshone Tribes, 623 F.2d 682, 685 (10th Cir. 1980), and a
very few criminal cases. See, e.g., Pacheco v. Geisen, No. 1:17cv-749-WJ-KRS, 2019 WL 1494036, at *1 (D.N.M. Apr. 4,
2019) (granting habeas and vacating tribal charges and
conviction in a case of uncontested facts alleging violations of
right to counsel, right to trial by jury and cruel and unusual
punishment); Toya v. Toledo, No. CIV 17-0258 JCH/KBM,
2017 WL 3995554, at *5 (D.N.M. Sept. 9) (recommending the
granting of habeas relief in a criminal case in which
petitioner was convicted and sentenced to jail without counsel
or a right to a jury trial), report and recommendation adopted
by No. CIV 17-0258 JCH/KBM, 2017 WL 4325764 (D.N.M.
Sept. 26, 2017); Garcia v. Rivas, No. 15-cv-337 MCA/SCY,
2016 WL 10538197, at *7 (D.N.M. Mar. 11), report and
recommendation adopted by No. 15-377 MCA/SCY, 2016 WL
10538196 (D.N.M. Apr. 12, 2016) (granting habeas for a tribal
member who had been incarcerated for longer than the 6-year
permitted of his sentence)). There are a few cases in which
judicial superintendence and control have been held to
constitute the requisite detention under 1303 as well. See
infra notes 154–159 accompanying text, discussing Dry v.
CFR Court of Indian Offense for Choctaw Nation and Means
v. Navajo Nation.
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and (4) those being ejected from tribal membership or
services.
A. Actual Incarceration
A tribe member who is jailed or imprisoned
unequivocally meets the requirements of detention if
they are able to get their petition filed during the carceral
window.140 An imminent threat of imprisonment can
also satisfy the custody requirement.141 The “detention”
requirement, thus, is not normally the main interpretive
issue in habeas actions filed in criminal cases where
Garcia, 2016 WL 10538197, at *7 (granting habeas for a
tribal member who had been incarcerated for longer than the
6-year permitted of his sentence). But cf. Jeffredo, 590 F.3d
at 757 (holding that “the limitation of Appellants’ access to
certain tribal facilities does not amount to a ‘detention’” when
“[a]ppellants have not been convicted, sentenced, or
permanently banished” (emphasis added)).
Professor
Barbara Creel of the University of New Mexico School of Law,
one of the leading experts on tribal habeas cases, individually
and in conjunction with the Southwest Indian Law Clinic at
the University of New Mexico School of Law, has been at the
forefront of representing individuals who have been convicted
in tribal court without adherence to basic civil rights such as
the right to counsel and due process. See, e.g., Barbara L.
Creel, The Right to Counsel for Indians Accused of Crime: A
Tribal and Congressional Imperative, 18 MICH. J. RACE & L.
317 (2013). Her work makes an enormous contribution to
those impacted by such convictions and the development of
federal and tribal law on the matter.
141 Jeffredo, 590 F.3d at 758 (citing Hensley v. Mun.
Court, 411 U.S. 345 (1973); Edmunds v. Won Bae Chang, 509
F.2d 39 (9th Cir. 1975)).
140
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individuals have been convicted and sentenced to terms
of imprisonment by tribal courts. Other issues do arise in
those contexts, however; and there are many barriers to
an incarcerated individual getting relief in the federal
courts. Many cases get dismissed on the grounds of
exhaustion, based on arguments about tribal court
appeals or proceedings that were not pursued.142 Indeed,
it is the rare case where a federal court finds that
remedies have been exhausted or would be futile.143 In
Valenzuela v. Silversmith, 699 F.3d 1199, 1208 (10th Cir.
2012) (dismissed without prejudice for failure to exhaust
tribal remedies after his tribal court sentence had been
completed and he was released during the pendency of the
case); Chipps v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, No. CIV. 10-5028-JLV,
2010 WL 1999458, at *8–9 (D.S.D. May 18, 2010) (“There is
no question Mr. Chipps is being detained by the Tribe.
Indeed, excluding the one day he was released to attend his
mother's
funeral,
Mr.
Chipps
has
been
in
continuous detention since his arrest by tribal authorities on
July 1, 2009 … Although the wheels of justice are turning
slowly, they are turning. Indian tribes have the inherent
authority to make and enforce their criminal laws
against Indian people on Indian lands. This court will not
infringe on the Tribe's authority by short circuiting the
Court's viable efforts to provide relief to Mr. Chipps.” (citing
United States v. Long, 324 F.3d 475, 480 (7th Cir. 2003)); see
also Anderson v. Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and
Chippewa Indians Tribal Court, No. 1:10-CV-676, 2010 WL
5625054, at *2 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 21, 2010) (dismissed without
prejudice due to failure to exhaust); Bercier v. Turtle
Mountain Tribal Court, No.4:08-cv-094, 2009 WL 113606
(D.N.D. 2009); Darnell v. Merchant, No. 17-03063-EFM-TJJ,
2017 WL 5889754, at *8 (D. Kan. Nov. 29, 2017). Blue v.
Marcellas, No. 4:06-cv-67, 2006 WL 2850600, at *3 (D.N.D.
Sept. 29, 2006).
143 See Toya v. Toledo, No. CIV 17-0258 JCH/KBM, 2017 WL
3995554, at *5 (D.N.M. Sept. 9) (recommending the granting
of habeas relief in a criminal case in which petitioner was
142
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some instances, cases have been dismissed on the
grounds of exhaustion, or even mootness based on tribes’
creation of new review entities or processes during the
pendency of the habeas action.144 There are issues about
who is the proper custodian/defendant.145 Some have
convicted and sentenced to jail without counsel or a right to a
jury trial), report and recommendation adopted by No. CIV
17-0258 JCH/KBM, 2017 WL 4325764 (D.N.M. Sept. 26,
2017); Garcia, 2016 WL 10538197, at *7.
144 For example, the Ninth Circuit summarily upheld
dismissal in Napoles v. Rogers, to require the parties to
complete proceedings before a tribal appellate court that was
disbanded at and prior to the filing of the habeas action. 743
Fed.App’x 136, 136 (9th Cir. 2018). In Coriz v. Rodriguez, the
magistrate recommended dismissal on the grounds of
mootness of a case wherein the tribe vacated petitioner’s
conviction and sentence but filed virtually identical charges
and kept petitioner in “pretrial” custody pending the
resolution of those charges, rather than proceed forward with
a case wherein the court had indicated that a finding of a
violation of ICRA was likely. 1:17-cv-01258-JB-KBM, 2018
WL 6111783, at *3, *7 (D.N.M. Nov. 21, 2018). Although these
issues of ripeness and mootness lie beyond the scope of this
paper, they do present incredible challenges to the ability of
individuals to have their rights determined in federal court,
even where they established proper jurisdiction and had
exhausted all remedies available at the time of filing. The
federal court’s extending of those doctrines in these
circumstances creates an additional barrier to individuals
having their rights determined in federal court that is not
warranted by the language or legislative history of ICRA, nor
interpretations of habeas under others of the federal statutes.
145 Toya, 2017 WL 4325764, at *1 (habeas petition granted;
tribal court conviction reversed based on denial of right to
counsel and jury trial. . . following joinder of appropriate
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even been dismissed on the grounds of mootness when
individuals get released from tribal custody, or
transferred to federal or other custody.146 This has been
tribal official, as recommended in Tova, 2017 WL 3995554, at
*5); Adams v. Elwell, No. CV 17-00285 RB/SCY, 2017 WL
3051951, at *2 (D.N.M. June 27, 2017) (petition dismissed
because his custody was transferred from tribal to federal
authority the day before the case was filed); Azure v. Turtle
Mountain Tribal Court, No. 4:08-cv-095, 2009 WL 113597, at
*3 (D.N.D. Jan. 15, 2009); Acosta-Vigil v. Delorme-Gaines,
672 F. Supp. 2d 1194, 1195 (D.N.M. 2009) (discussing the
dispute about the appropriate parties); Lavallie v. Turtle
Mountain Tribal Court, No. 4-06-CV-9, 2006 WL 1069704, at
*3 (D.N.D. Apr. 18, 2006) (holding that the tribal court was
best able to decide the merits of the case); Cantrell v. Jackson,
No. CV 16-33-GF-BMM-JTJ 2016 WL 4537942, at *2 (D.
Mont. Aug. 5, 2016); see, e.g., Garcia v. Elwell, No. CV 1700333 WJ/GJF, 2017 WL 3172826, at *2 (D.N.M. May 25,
2017) (dismissing tribe, but leaving actual wardens, tribal
governor/tribal court judge) (“In a habeas corpus proceeding,
the custodian or official having immediate physical custody
of the petitioner is a proper party to the proceeding. However,
where the petition collaterally attacks the petitioner’s tribal
conviction and sentence, rather than the manner in which
the detention is being carried out, the immediate physical
custodian may lack the authority to afford the relief
requested by the petitioner. In these circumstances, the
proper respondent is not necessarily the person with
immediate physical custody but, instead, the official with
authority to modify the tribal conviction or sentence.” (citing
Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 452 U.S. 426, 446–47 (2004); Poodry v.
Tonawanda Band of Seneca Indians, 85 F.3d 874, 899–900
(2d Cir. 1996)).
146 See e.g., Brisbois v. Tulalip Tribal Court, CASE NO. 2:18cv-01677-TSZ-BAT, 2019 WL 1522540, at *4 (W.D. Wash.
Feb. 27), report and recommendation adopted by Case No.
2:18-cv-01677-TSZ-BAT, 2019 WL 1514550, at *1 (W.D.
Wash. Apr. 8, 2019) (dismissing habeas petition due to
petitioner being released from custody during the pendency
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so even when serious jurisdictional challenges were
presented such as the tribal court’s lack of criminal
jurisdiction over an individual who is not a member of
the tribe.147 However, of those cases where charges may
have been dismissed, the ongoing collateral consequences
of the convictions are sometimes assessed as grounds for
continuation of the case.148 A few challenges analyzed
of the habeas case and the fact that petitioner’s tribal court
appeal was yet pending at the time he filed his federal action);
Romero v. Goodrich, Civil No. 1:09-cv-232 RB/DJS, 2010 WL
8983216, at *11 (D.N.M. Mar. 9) (first decision recommending
granting of habeas), report and recommendation withdrawn
No. 1:09-cv-232 RB/DJS, 2010 WL 9450759, at *1 (D.N.M.
Sept. 22, 2010). Habeas relief over tribal conviction and order
of incarceration was initially recommended by the district
court, but the case was ultimately dismissed as moot upon
the tribe’s commuting of his tribal sentence in light of federal
charges pressed for his alleged assault of a federal officer
during his period of tribal incarceration. Romero v. Goodrich,
480 F. App’x 489, 494 (10th Cir. 2012) (affirming dismissal as
moot based on vacating tribal sentence and insufficiently
articulated collateral consequences).
147 See Acosta-Vigil, 672 F. Supp. 2d at 1196; Gillette v.
Marcellais, No. A4-04-123, 2004 WL 2677268, at *3, *4
(D.N.D. Nov. 22), reh’g denied, No. A4-04-123, 2004 WL
2792331 (D.N.D. Dec. 1, 2004).
148 See, e.g., Stymiest v. Rosebud Sioux Tribe, No. CIV. 143001, 2014 WL 1165925, at *3 (D.S.D. Mar. 18, 2014.).
Although Stymiest was dismissed without prejudice to permit
petitioner to exhaust tribal remedies, the court found that the
collateral consequences of the tribal court convictions, even
though he had been released from tribal custody, were
sufficiently great to justify a determination of ongoing
detention notwithstanding his completing his tribal sentence.
Id. (“In this case, Stymiest's tribal court convictions provided
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the substantive limit imposed on Tribes of no more than
one year of incarceration per “offense” under ICRA’s §
1302(7).149 Finally, issues have arisen with respect to the
actual relief that the federal court may grant upon a
finding of grounds that habeas is warranted.150
a basis, at least in part, for determining that he was an
“Indian” for the purposes of jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. §
1153 and the resulting federal criminal conviction for assault
resulting in serious bodily injury. In this case, the
government was required to prove that Stymiest was
recognized as an Indian by an Indian tribe. Evidence was
presented that the Rosebud Sioux Tribe recognized Stymiest
as an Indian by prosecuting him in tribal court. The jury was
instructed that they could consider such evidence in
determining whether the government had shown that the
defendant was recognized as an Indian and therefore was
an Indian for the purposes of federal jurisdiction. I find that
Stymiest can demonstrate that he has been subjected to a
severe actual or potential restraint on liberty partly as a
result of his tribal court convictions.”).
149 See, e.g., Alvarez v. Tracey ex rel. Gila River Indian Cmty.
Dep’t of Rehab. & Supervision, No. CV-08-2226-PHX-DGC
(DKD), 2011 WL 1211549, at *3 (D. Ariz. Mar. 31, 2011)
(denying Petitioner’s argument that his conviction of five
separate charges and sentencing to five consecutive years of
incarceration violated § 1302(7) on the grounds that “two
charges are different offenses if each ‘requires proof of a fact
which the other does not,’ regardless of whether they arise
from the same transaction.” Id. (quoting Blockburger v.
United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932)); see also Miranda v.
Achondo, 684 F.3d 844 (9th Cir. 2014); Bustamante v.
Valenzuela, 715 F. Supp. 2d 960, 968 (D. Ariz. 2010) (the
initial recommendation was to grant habeas but the rejected
that part of the recommendation); cf. Spears v. Red Lake
Band of Chippewa Indians, 363 F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1180 (D.
Minn. 2005).
150 Tortalita v. Geisen, No. 1:17-cv-684-RB-KRS, 2018 WL
2441157 at *2 (D.N.M. May 31, 2018) (vacating petitioner’s
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Interestingly, with respect to those cases affirmatively
granting habeas relief, many involved situations in
which neither the physical custodian nor other tribal
official contested the underlying merits of the claims.151
B. Judicial Control and Restraint Pending or
Following Judicial Action
As with other federal habeas statutes, there is an
independent basis for jurisdiction created by the
measures of judicial control and superintendence
imposed under the cloak of authority of a tribal court.
In Hensley v. Municipal Court, the Supreme
Court determined federal habeas review to be invoked by
an order of personal recognizance requiring petitioner to
appear at times and places as ordered by any court or
sentence and conviction, not reversing it, was the appropriate
remedy, as Petitioner had not specifically requested that and
it invited federal courts in reversing a tribal court to develop
a new remedy “that would further impede tribal
sovereignty”). But see Alvarez v. Lopez, 835 F.3d 1024, 1030
(9th Cir. 2016) (wherein the court granted “automatic
reversal” of a tribal court conviction because it had not
afforded Petitioner the right to a jury trial).
151 See, e.g., Cheykaychi v. Geisen, Case No. 17-cv-01657PAB, 2018 WL 6065492, at *2 (D. Colo. Nov. 19, 2018) (citing
Chosa v. Geisen , No. 17-cv-00110-RB-SMV (D.N.M. May 24,
2017) (No. 13); Pacheco v. Massingill, No. 10-cv-00923-RBWDS (D.N.M. January 9, 2012) (Docket No. 18) ; Van Pelt III
v. G[ei]sen, No. 17-cv-00647-RB-KRS (D.N.M. May 11, 2018)
(Nos. 33, 34); Tortalita v. Geisen, No. 17-cv-00684-RB-KRS
(D.N.M. May 31, 2018) (Nos. 33, 35)) (“Because
the § 1303 Petition is unopposed, the Petition will be granted
and the tribal court convictions vacated”).
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magistrate and other restraints “not shared by the public
generally.”152 Outside of the tribal context, a number of
other cases have held habeas to be the appropriate
remedy for other forms of judicial superintendence and
control.153
This basis for habeas jurisdiction has also been
recognized in the context of ICRA. In Dry v. CFR,
petitioners’ release on their own recognizance following
charges of various violations of the criminal code was
deemed by the Tenth Circuit to be sufficient.154
Explained the court: “Although Appellants are ostensibly
free to come and go as they please, they remain obligated
to appear for trial at the court's discretion. This is
sufficient to meet the ‘in custody’ requirement of
the habeas statute.”155 Similarly, in Means v. Navajo
Nation, the Ninth Circuit also upheld jurisdiction under
§ 1303 for pretrial release.156 Under the terms of the
release order, petitioner was prohibited from having
contact with his former father-in-law or going within 100
yards of his home, and he was ordered to appear at trial
and face arrest or additional punishment for failure to
appear.157
Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345, 351 (1973)
(quoting Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 240 (1963)).
153 See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
154 Dry v. CFR Court of Indian Offenses for Choctaw Nation,
168 F.3d 1207, 1208 (10th Cir. 1999) (citing Lydon, 466 U.S.
at 300–301). The court deemed “detention” and “in custody”
to be analogous terms. Dry, 168 F.3d at 1208.
155 Id.
156 Means v. Navajo Nation, 432 F.3d 924, 928–29 (9th Cir.
2005) (agreeing with the district court that “Means was in
custody for purposes of habeas jurisdiction under Justices of
Boston Municipal Court v. Lydon and Hensley v. Municipal
Court.”).
157 Id.; see also Fife v. Moore, 808 F.Supp.2d 1310, 1312–13
(E.D. Okla. 2011) (detention established for purposes of 1303
152
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Although a recognized basis for establishing
detention, orders of judicial superintendence granted in
advance of final resolution of tribal proceedings such as
pre-trial orders of release may sometimes conflict with
the doctrine of exhaustion. Some courts have recognized
that such pretrial habeas petitions need be considered
due to the onerous restraints they impose or the
fundamental jurisdictional issues implicated. For
example, in Means v. Northern Cheyenne Tribal Court,
the Ninth Circuit granted pretrial habeas consideration
in advance of trial to consider a jurisdictional challenge
to the prosecution in tribal court brought by an Indian
who was not a member of that tribe.158 Other courts,

even though petitioner had been released on bond at the time
of the filing) (“In Dry v. CFR Court, 168 F.3d 1207, 1208 &
n.1 (10th Cir. 1999), the Tenth Circuit held that criminal
defendants who had been released on their own recognizance
pending trial by the Court of Indian Offenses for the Choctaw
Nation were ‘detained’ for habeas purposes. In the case at
bar, petitioners also await trial and have been released on
bond. This requirement is satisfied.”). The case also granted
emergency injunctive relief since the allegation was the tribal
court lacked jurisdiction altogether. Fife, 808 F. Supp. at
1315.
158 Means v. Northern Cheyenne Tribal Court, 154 F.3d 941,
949 (9th Cir. 1998), rev'd on other grounds by United States
v. Enas, 255 F.3d 662 (9th Cir. 2001). Although upholding a
basis for jurisdiction based on the pre-trial detention of
petitioner, the court also observed that petitioner, in fact, had
presented his jurisdictional argument to both the Tribal
Court and the Northern Cheyenne Court of Appeals, both of
which denied his claim, prior to his filing in federal court,
thereby exhausting his tribal court remedies to the
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however, have required strict compliance with
exhaustion in order to effectuate the purpose of
exhaustion: namely, “to promote ‘tribal self-government
and self-determination’ by allowing tribal courts to ‘have
the first opportunity to evaluate the factual and legal
bases for the challenge to [their] jurisdiction.’” 159 The
circumstances of each case and the remedies available at
the time of filing must be assessed.
C. Challenges to Tribal Court Child Custody
Determinations
A number of cases seeking to invoke ICRA’s 1303
“detention” jurisdiction have involved challenges to child
custody proceedings. Generally, it has been determined,
as with respect to state court child custody
determinations between private parties, that 1303 is not
a proper vehicle for challenging custody determinations
of a tribal court where it has proper jurisdictional
authority over the matter.160 Similar logic has been
satisfaction of the court; see also Carden v. Montana, 626 F.2d
82, 83 (9th Cir. 1980).
159 Means, 154 F.3d at 949 (citing Iowa Mutual Ins. Co. v.
LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 15–16 (1987)). For an example of a pretrial superintendence case that held exhaustion was
mandatory, i.e, that petitioner must go through the trial and
appellate processes afforded within the tribal system, see
Lambert v. Fort Peck Assiniboine & Sioux Tribes, No. CV 1582-GF-BMM-JTJ, 2016 WL 403045, at *2 (D. Mont. Jan. 11,
2016). See also supra note 146 and accompanying text for the
exhaustion cases in the context of custody where individuals
were alleging serious jurisdictional or other impediments to
the tribal court process but were nonetheless required to go
through the tribal court processes.
160 Goslin v. Kickapoo Nation District Court, No. 98-4107-SC,
1998 WL 1054223, at *3 (D. Kan. Dec. 2, 1998) (drawing from
the developed law under habeas jurisdiction for state courts
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applied to dependency proceedings in which the tribal
children’s services department seeks intervention to
address abuse, neglect or dependency.161 Successful
challenges under 1303 have occurred where individuals
in 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and concluding “courts have held that
federal habeas relief is not available under 25 U.S.C.
§ 1303 to test the validity of a child custody decree of
an Indian tribal court.” Id. (quoting Poodry v. Tonawanda
Band of Seneca Indians, 85 F.3d 874, 892)); see also AzureLone Fight v. Cain, 317 F.Supp.2d 1148, 1151 (D.N.D. 2004);
Weatherwax ex rel. Carlson v. Fairbanks, 619 F. Supp. 294,
296 (D. Mont., 1985) (section 1303 is not proper vehicle for
challenging a custody determination of the tribal court – “A
child custody ruling is not sufficient to trigger
federal habeas corpus relief since the custody involved is not
the kind which has traditionally prompted federal courts to
assert their jurisdiction.”); LaBeau v. Dakota, 815 F. Supp.
1074, 1076–77 (W.D. Mich. 1993); Sandman v. Dakota, 816 F.
Supp. 448, 451 (W.D. Mich.1992), aff'd,7 F.3d 234 (6th Cir.
1993); Shelifoe v. Dakota, No. 92-1086, 1992 WL 133065, at
*1 (6th Cir. June 16, 1992) (unpublished table decision). In
analyzing the scope of § 1303, some courts have drawn also
from the law that has been applied in the context of state
custody determinations. See, e.g., Doe v. Doe, 660 F.2d 101,
105 (4th Cir. 1981); Sylvander v. New Eng. Home for Little
Wanderers, 584 F.2d 1103, 1112 (1st Cir. 1978); Donnelly v.
Donnelly, 515 F.2d 129, 130 (1st Cir. 1975).
161 See, e.g., Johnson v. B.J. Jones, No. 6:05-cv-1256-Orl22KRS, 2005 WL 8159765, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 3, 2005).
Explained the court: “‘Habeas corpus relief under 25 U.S.C.
§ 1303 is generally not available to challenge the propriety or
wisdom of a tribal court’s decision in a child custody dispute’
. . . In the Court’s view, this limitation applies with equal
force to child dependency proceedings.” (quoting Azure-Lone
Fight, 317 F. Supp. 2d at 1150).
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have challenged the tribal court’s authority over the
custody determination itself, particularly when it
involved recognition and enforcement of a prior state
court determination on the matter. In DeMent v. Oglala
Sioux Tribal Court, for example, the Eighth Circuit held
that a federal court may hear a habeas petition upon a
challenge to a tribal court illegally taking custody of
children and exceeding its jurisdiction.162 As explained
by the court:
[The petitioner] does not directly attack
the tribal court's decision to award Redner
custody. Rather, he alleges that the tribal
court illegally took “custody” of the
children on the reservation by making
them wards of the tribal court and by
refusing to enforce the California custody
decree. This case no longer represents a
child custody battle; it has become a
dispute over whether a tribal court violates
a
non-Indian's due
process rights by
refusing to give full faith and credit to a
state custody decree.163
Jurisdiction over such challenges may be rooted in
the habeas provisions of § 1303 and present an
independent basis for jurisdiction as a federal question
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.164
Dement v. Ogala Sioux Tribal Court, 874 F.2d 510, 515–
16 (8th Cir. 1989); see also United States v. Cobell, 503 F.2d
790, 795 (9th Cir. 1974).
163 Dement, 874 F.2d at 515.
164 See, e.g., Brown ex rel Brown v. Rice, 760 F. Supp. 1459,
1462 (D. Kan. 1991) (parents’ challenge to tribal court
authority to restrict movement of their children constituted a
detention under § 1303 and an independent federal question
162
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D. Physical Banishment, Ejectment, Physical
and Geographical Restraint
In a number of tribal contexts, permanent
banishment from tribal lands and/or exclusion from
membership and tribal services have been imposed on
individuals. In some tribal contexts, banishment was a
traditional punishment employed to preserve order
within the community and/or to rehabilitate the
individual.165 Historically, the remedy was imposed for
periods of time in response to flagrant crimes such as
murder to enable reflection by the individual and restore
peace and security to the tribal membership.166 In
basis for jurisdiction under § 1331). Explained the court: “The
Supreme Court has held that challenges to the exercise of
jurisdiction by a tribal court present a question of federal
common law which can be heard in a federal court under the
general federal question statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Other
courts have also held that parents may challenge the
jurisdiction of tribal courts to make custody determinations
under the habeas corpus provisions set out in 25 U.S.C.
§ 1303 . . . This would be another means of presenting
basically the same federal question to this court.” Id.
(internal citations omitted).
165 Angela R. Riley, Good (Native) Governance, 107 COLUM.
L. REV. 1049, 1103 (2007); accord Patrice H.
Kunesh, Banishment as Cultural Justice in Contemporary
Tribal Legal Systems, 37 N.M. L. REV. 85, 88 (2007).
166 Michael Cousins, Aboriginal Justice: A Haudenosaunee
Approach, in JUSTICE AS HEALING: INDIGENOUS WAYS 141,
154–55 (Wanda D. McCaslin ed., 2005) (“Banishment rarely
occurs for life, and individuals often return home after a
prescribed period of exile. They are allowed to remain if they
have fully embraced the principles of peace and unity.”). The

[125]

63

Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy, Vol. 14, Iss. 1 [2019], Art. 1
TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
VOLUME 14 | SUMMER 2019 | ISSUE 1

modern times, however, banishment has been used to
impose greater punishment in criminal cases than what
is authorized under federal law.167 Additionally, it has
been invoked in retaliation for protests or other
challenges to tribal leadership. When accompanied by
disenrollment from tribal membership, it may be a
means of decreasing the pool of per capita distributions
available from gaming. A desire to expand tribal casinos
or other facilities may also contribute to these actions as
may disputes over accountability in the face of
accusations of corruption and mismanagement of tribal

devastating impact of banishment has even been
characterized by Shakespeare:
ROMEO
Ha, banishment? Be merciful, say 'death,'
For exile hath more terror in his look,
Much more than death. Do not say
'banishment.'
FRIAR LAURENCE
Here from Verona art thou banishèd:
Be patient, for the world is broad and wide.
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO AND JULIET, act 3,
sc. 3.
167 Originally and until 2010, tribes were limited to penalties
of one-year of incarceration. See Pub. L. No. 99-570, §4217,
100 Stat. 3207 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §1302(7) (2006)). But
see Pub. L. No. 111-211, 124 Stat. 2279 (codified at 25 U.S.C.
§§1302(a)(7)(C)-(D), (b) (Supp. IV 2010)) (raising maximum
sentence permitted to three years for any one offense for
repeat offenders and up to nine years of sentences in cases
where more than one violation of the criminal code has been
established). Thus, there have been incentives to use
banishment in response to repeat offenders or those who
commit more major breaches of community norms and safety,
where federal prosecutions did not effectively remove or
punish the member.
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funds and resources.168 In the words of one journalist:
“Although disenrollment is a relatively modern
phenomenon among the 567 federally recognized tribes,
its causes—greed and government corruption—are
familiar.”169
Suzianne D. Painter-Thorne, If You Build It, They Will
Come:
Preserving Tribal Sovereignty in
the
Face
of Indian Casinos and the New Premium on Tribal
Membership, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 311, 312–14, 320
(2010) (citing Kevin Fagan, Tribes Toss Out Members in
High-Stakes Quarrel, S.F. CHRON. (Apr. 20, 2008), https://ww
w.sfgate.com/news/article/Tribes-toss-out-members-in-highstakes-quarrel-3287315.php (noting that tribes in California
alone have disenrolled over 5,000 members since 2002)
[https://perma.cc/U8J3-CUEQ]); see Cecily Hilleary, Native
American Tribal Disenrollment Reaching Epic Levels, VOICE
OF AMERICA (Mar. 2, 2011), https://www.voanews.com/a/nat
ive-american-tribal-disenrollment-reaching-epidemic-levels/
3748192.html [https://perma.cc/UK2Z-Q95R]; see also Marc
Cooper, Tribal Flush: Pechanga People “Disenrolled” En
Masse, L.A. WEEKLY (Jan. 3, 2008), http://www.laweekly.
com/2008-01-03/news/tribal-flush-pechanga-people-disenroll
ed-en-masse/ (discussing how tribes have disenrolled
thousands of members due to corruption and other problems
stemming from gaming) [https://perma.cc/7W2E-GRZR];
Brook Jarvis, Who Decides Who Counts as Native American,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 18, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/01/18/magazine/who-decides-who-counts-as-nativeamerican.html [https://perma.cc/Q96H-A4A7].
169 Jaime Dunaway, The Fight Over Who’s a “Real Indian,”
SLATE MAG. (June 12, 2018), https://slate.com/news-andpolitics/2018/06/native-american-disenrollments-arewaning-after-decades-of-tribes-stripping-citizenship-frommembers.html (describing the widespread phenomenon of
tribal disenrollment, its connection to tribal greed, and
168
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When it happens, the individuals are left
alienated from their nations and communities and
unable to partake in some or all of essential tribal events
and services. They may be ostracized from critical
cultural association as well. Oftentimes, banishment and
disenrollment have been employed together, leaving the
individual totally bereft of cultural connection and
identity and ineligible for federal, state, and tribal
programs applicable to Native Americans.170 As with
denationalization of citizenship, disenrollment and
banishment can create a state of psychological
devastation, as well as economic and legal
disenfranchisement.171 Indeed, one would be stripped
from identity as an Indian altogether since each tribe
determines its own criteria for membership as a matter
of both tribal and federal law.172 Although this point is
not raised as often, it is also true that the integrity of the
sovereignty of the tribe itself may be diminished as the
membership and participation of active members in their
communities is disrupted, and corrupt officials who took
the offending actions may squander tribal resources and
goodwill without accountability.173 A number of scholars
corruption fueled by gaming and casino development, while
also indicating a reduction in disenrollment as well as
exhibiting selective examples of reenrollment in response to
advocacy initiatives of tribal members) [https://perma.cc/
M9JF-KYVY].
170
Associated Press, Disenrollment Leaves Natives
“Culturally Homeless,” CBS NEWS (Jan. 20, 2014),
https://www.cbsnews.
com/news/disenrollment-leavesnatives-culturally-homeless/
[https://perma.cc/W8RWEAZN].
171 See id.
172 See id.
173 See, e.g., Michael Martinez, Indians Decry Banishment by
Their Tribe, Chi. Trib. (Jan. 14, 2016), http://articles.chicago
tribune.com/2006-01-14/news/0601140134_1_tribal-casino-
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have articulated the toll of both banishment and
disenrollment, most arguing in the end for limited or no
federal review of such cases despite the impacts and
substantive rights violations.174
A significant number of federal habeas cases have
involved banishment or other exclusion from tribal lands
and/or facilities or services. As discussed in more detail
below, tribal membership and enrollment decisions have
been determined not to meet the requirements of § 1303.
Two cases have determined permanent banishment to be
grounds for federal habeas review.175 The Ninth Circuit
issued the landmark case holding that a tribal member
who is “convicted of treason, sentenced to permanent
banishment, and permanently [deprived of] any and all
rights afforded to tribal members” is “detained” for
purposes of ICRA habeas relief.176 Such action was
deemed a “severe actual or potential restraint on
liberty.”177 In the second case, certain tribal officials
convicted petitioners of treason and issued orders of
“banishment” that read in part:
american-indians-gaming-profits [https://perma.cc/838N-F7
EB].
174
See DAVID WILKINS & SHELLY HULSE WILKINS,
DISMEMBERED: NATIVE AMERICAN DISENROLLMENT AND THE
BATTLE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 162 (Charlotte Cotè & Coll
Thrush eds., 2017); see also Mary Swift, Banishing Habeas
Jurisdiction: Why Federal Courts Lack Jurisdiction to Hear
Tribal Banishment Actions, 86 WASH. L. REV. 941, 970–71
(2006).
175 Poodry v. Tonawanda Band of Seneca Indians, 85 F.3d
874, 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1996); Jeffredo v. Macarro, 599 F.3d
913, 919 (9th Cir. 2010).
176 Jeffredo, 599 F.3d at 919.
177 Id. (emphasis added).
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You are to leave now and never return . . .
[Y]our name is removed from the Tribal
rolls, your Indian name is taken away, and
your lands will become the responsibility of
the Council of Chiefs. You are now stripped
of
your
Indian
citizenship
and
permanently lose any and all rights
afforded our members. YOU MUST
LEAVE IMMEDIATELY AND WE WILL
WALK WITH YOU TO THE OUTER
BORDERS OF OUR TERRITORY.178
As with many tribal disputes resulting in serious
rights violations, the precipitating conduct that gave rise
to the banishment was petitioners’ challenge to the
official actions of certain members of the tribal council.179
Specifically, petitioners accused members of the Council,
particularly its Chairman, of “misusing tribal funds,
suspending tribal elections, excluding members of the
Council of Chiefs from the tribe's business affairs, and
burning tribal records.”180 In consultation with other
tribal members, petitioners formed an Interim General
Council of the Tonawanda Band.181 The response by
council members who were challenged was to accost
petitioners in their homes with groups of 15 to 25 people,
serve them with the banishment orders, which also
removed them forever from the tribal rolls and their
Indian citizenship.182 The tribe issued notice to the
federal government to have petitioners removed from
federal rolls as Native Americans for the purpose of
Poodry, 85 F.3d at 876.
Id. at 877.
180 Id. at 877–78.
181 Id. at 878.
182 Id.
178
179
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access to health care and other federal benefits.183
Electrical services of petitioners were also cut at the
direction of tribal council members.184 Following a
thorough analysis of ICRA’s habeas provision, the
legislative history, Santa Clara Pueblo, and all
interpretive priorities, including the twin aims of
accommodating both tribal sovereignty and the rights of
individuals,185 the Second Circuit determined these
circumstances demonstrated a sufficiently severe
restraint on liberty to warrant jurisdiction under §
1303.186 Explained the court:
Indeed, we think the existence of the orders
of permanent banishment alone—even
absent attempts to enforce them—would be
sufficient to satisfy the jurisdictional
prerequisites for habeas corpus. We deal
here not with a modest fine or a short
suspension of a privilege—found not to
satisfy the custody requirement for habeas
relief—but
with
the
coerced
and
peremptory deprivation of the petitioners'
membership in the tribe and their social
and cultural affiliation. To determine the
severity of the sanction, we need only look
to the orders of banishment themselves,
which suggest that banishment is imposed
(without notice) only for the most severe of
crimes: murder, rape, and treason . . . We
Id.
Id.
185 Id. at 900–01.
186 Id. at 901.
183
184
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believe that Congress could not have
intended to permit a tribe to circumvent
the
ICRA's
habeas
provision
by
permanently banishing, rather than
imprisoning, members “convicted” of the
offense of treason.187
In Sweet v. Hinzman, the Western District of
Washington similarly found that an order of banishment
by the Snoqualmie Indian Tribal Council met the
detention requirements.188 In that case, petitioners
alleged that “exclusion from tribal lands and loss of tribal
identity is a severe restraint on their personal liberty”
and that they would be denied access to critical services,
including Indian Health Services' health care, and lose
certain tribal employment opportunities, as a result.189
Id. at 895.
Sweet v. Hinzman, 634 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1200 (W.D.
Wash. 2008).
189 Id. at 1198; see also Colebut v. Mashantucket Pequot
Tribal Nation Tribal Elders Council, No. 3:05CV247, 2006
WL 1646155, at *1 (D. Conn. June 9, 2006). In Colebut, the
district court initially determined that petitioner, a former
president seeking reinstatement to office, presented a
colorable claim of subject matter jurisdiction under § 1303
where Council “‘temporarily banished [Colebut] from the
Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Reservation and/or other lands
of the Mashantucket Pequot Tribe under the suspicion of
possession of illegal drugs on the reservation’ and declared
Colebut's forfeit of ‘all rights and privileges of tribal
membership’ save health care,” but dismissed the case on the
grounds that he had not yet exhausted remedies with the
tribal council or ensured that they rendered a final decision.
Colebut, 2006 WL 1646155, at *1. After that decision,
however, the prosecutor withdrew the banishment and
membership decisions, curing the detention. Colebut v.
Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Nation Tribal Elders Council,
187
188
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In each of these cases, what is critical is that the
effect of the offending tribal action was to physically
remove, eject, and restrain tribal members from tribal
land. This happens in the case of actual forcible removal
as well as by purported court order creating the risk of
being arrested and cited and suffer other collateral
consequences. As the Poodry court reasoned:
“Restraint” does not require “on-going
supervision” or “prior approval.” As long as
the banishment orders stand, the
petitioners may be removed from the
Tonawanda Reservation at any time. That
they have not been removed thus far does
not render them ‘free’ or ‘unrestrained.’
While ‘supervision’ (or harassment) by
tribal officials or others acting on their
behalf may be sporadic, that only makes it
all the more pernicious. Unlike an
individual on parole, on probation, or
serving
a
suspended
sentence—all
“restraints”
found
to
satisfy
the
requirement of custody—the petitioners
have no ability to predict if, when, or how
their sentences will be executed. The
petitioners may currently be able to “come
and go” as they please, [ . . .] but the
No: 3:05CV247 (DJS) 2007 WL 174384, at *1 (D. Conn. Jan.
19, 2007). Thereafter, the individual sought to reopen the
case for damages, but the court determined that the scope of
§ 1303 did not permit such a waiver of the tribe’s sovereign
immunity. Id. at *4.
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banishment orders make clear that at
some point they may be compelled to “go,”
and no longer welcome to “come.” That is a
severe restraint to which the members of
the Tonawanda Band are not generally
subject. Indeed, we think the existence of
the orders of permanent banishment
alone-even absent attempts to enforce
them-would be sufficient to satisfy the
jurisdictional prerequisites for habeas
corpus.190
On the other hand, in Jeffredo v. Macarro—a case
also involving dis-enrollment of tribal members and
resulting collateral consequences—the Ninth Circuit
found neither the possibility of banishment due to
becoming a non-member nor petitioners’ resulting denial
of access to the Senior Citizens' Center, health clinic, and
tribal school was sufficiently imminent or severe to
constitute a detention.191 The court explained:
In the case before us, the denial of access
to certain facilities does not pose a severe
actual or potential restraint on the
Appellants' liberty. Appellants have not
been banished from the Reservation.
Appellants have never been arrested,
imprisoned, fined, or otherwise held by the
Tribe. Appellants have not been evicted
from their homes or suffered destruction of
their property. No personal restraint
(other than access to these facilities) has
been imposed on them as a result of the

190
191

Poodry, 85 F.3d at 895.
Jeffredo v. Macarro, 599 F.3d 913, 918–19 (9th Cir. 2010).
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Tribe's actions. Their movements have not
been restricted on the Reservation.192
A similar determination was rendered in another
case by the Second Circuit in which petitioners
experienced less severe restraints than banishment.
Specifically, it was determined that loss of “voice” in the
community, loss of health insurance, loss of access to
tribal health and recreation facilities, loss of quarterly
distributions to tribal members, and loss of one's place on
the membership rolls of the tribe are simply “insufficient
to bring plaintiffs within [the] ICRA's habeas
provision.” 193 At least one federal court has determined
that trespassing and excluding a non-member from a
reservation did not present a proper basis for habeas in
deference to the primacy of tribes’ inherent authority to
exclude those who are not members.194 The lessons from
Id. at 919.
Shenandoah v. U.S. Dept. of Interior, 159 F.3d 708, 714
(2d Cir.1998).
194 Liska v. Macarro, No. 08-CV-1872IEG, 2009 WL 2424293,
at *7 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2009). In Liska, the descendant of a
tribe who was not permitted to enroll and, thus, was not a
tribal member, did not present a proper basis for habeas even
though he was banned from the reservation for trespassing
upon it without permission. Id. at *1. According to the court,
the petitioner “cited no authority for the proposition that a
non-member of a tribe who is excluded from a reservation is
‘detained’ as contemplated by § 1303. In fact, Ninth Circuit
authority conclusively establishes that “[i]n the absence of
treaty provisions or congressional pronouncements to the
contrary, the tribe has the inherent power to exclude nonmembers from the reservation.” Id. at *7 (quoting Quechan
Tribe of Indians v. Rowe, 531 F.2d 408, 410 (9th Cir. 1976)).
192
193
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the cases, then, is that extreme and permanent forms of
banishment from reservation lands are required before
detention may be recognized for the purposes of federal
habeas jurisdiction. It is not an easy standard to meet.
E. Membership and Disenrollment
Absent geographical banishment from tribal
lands, the courts have determined that orders of
disenrollment in and of themselves do not present the
severity of restraint detention sufficient for § 1303.195
Nonetheless, like banishment, the remedy of
disenrollment by tribal officials has sometimes arisen in
the context of intertribal disputes about governance or
financial accountability and may sometimes be
incentivized in tribal contexts where casino profits may
be distributed to tribal members on a per capita basis.
Notwithstanding the social and cultural implications of
enrollment decisions, the federal courts have consistently
declined to find habeas jurisdiction in matters concerning
disenrollment of tribal members absent other indicia of
geographical displacement.196 Two primary reasons
justify this conclusion. First, most courts have deemed
disenrollment to be an insufficiently severe restraint on
liberty.197 Second, decisions about membership and
enrollment are core to tribal sovereignty and selfdetermination. “[C]ourts have consistently recognized
See, e.g., Hendrix v. Coffey, No. CIV-08-605-M, 2008 WL
2740901, at *3 (W.D. Okla. July 10), aff’ d, 305 F. App’x 495
(10th Cir. 2008) (declining to extend jurisdiction to claims
brought by the plaintiffs); see also John v. Garcia, No. C 1602368 WHA, 2018 WL 1569760, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 31,
2018) (notice of disenrollment insufficient).
196 See infra notes 198–201 and 205–11 and accompanying
text.
197 See, e.g., John, 2018 WL 1569760, at *4.
195
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that in absence of express legislation by Congress to the
contrary, a tribe has the complete authority to determine
all questions of its own membership, as a political
entity.”198 In the words of the Eighth Circuit:
The great weight of authority holds that
tribes have exclusive authority to
determine membership issues. A sovereign
tribe's ability to determine its own
membership lies at the very core of tribal
self-determination; indeed, there is
perhaps no greater intrusion upon tribal
sovereignty than for a federal court to
interfere with a sovereign tribe's
membership determinations.199
As explained by the Ninth Circuit:
While we have the most sympathy for this
argument, we find no precedent for the
proposition that disenrollment alone is
sufficient to be considered detention
under § 1303. While Congress' authority
over Indian matters is extraordinarily
broad . . . the role of courts in adjusting
relations between and among tribes and
their members [is] correspondingly
restrained. Further, [a] tribe's right to
define its own membership for tribal
198 Martinez v. S. Ute Tribe of S. Ute Reservation, 249 F.2d
915, 920 (10th Cir. 1957) (upholding dismissal of the tribal
membership action for lack of federal question jurisdiction).
199 Smith v. Babbitt, 100 F.3d 556, 559 (8th Cir. 1996).
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purposes has long been recognized as
central to its existence as an independent
political community. We have also noted
that [a]n Indian tribe has the power to
define membership as it chooses, subject to
the plenary power of Congress. Thus
(while Congress may have authority in
these matters) in the complete absence of
precedent, we cannot involve the courts in
these disputes.200
Efforts have been made to liken disenrollment to
denaturalization of citizens, which has been recognized
as a significant constitutional violation by the Supreme
Court.201
However, in the situation where tribal
disenrollment has been at issue, the Supreme Court’s
precedent has been distinguished.202 As the Ninth Circuit
has declared in the face of the argument: “We do not wish
to minimize the impact of the Tribe's membership
decision on Appellants. Indeed, we recognize that

Jeffredo, 599 F.3d at 920 (quoting Santa Clara
Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 72 n.32; Williams v. Gover, 490 F.3d 785,
789 (9th Cir. 2007)); see also Fondahn v. Native Village of
Tyonek, 450 F.2d 520, 522 (9th Cir. 1971) (determining that
Santa Clara Pueblo held “that a dispute involving
membership in a tribe does not present a federal question”).
201 See supra note 107.
202 Jeffredo, 599 F.3d at 921 (citing Trop, 356 U.S. at 87–88,
96) (“Trop is inapposite to this case. In Trop the statute left
the defendant stateless. Further, the statute was penal in
nature. Here Appellants have not been left stateless, and
nothing in the record indicates that the disenrollment
proceedings were undertaken to punish Appellants.
Therefore, Trop is not controlling.”)). But see Poodry, 85 F.3d
at 895–96.
200
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Appellants have suffered a significant loss. Nevertheless,
such loss is simply not equivalent to detention.”203
While membership decisions may be entitled to
more judicial restraint due to their fundamental bearing
on this core aspect of tribal sovereignty, it is still
necessary to examine the actual circumstances of
confinement regardless of how a remedy is characterized.
In Quair v. Sisco, petitioners were both banished and
disenrolled.204 Respondents sought to distinguish the two
remedies and argued that disenrollment was not entitled
to federal review.205 However, the court found that it
could examine “disenrollment” even if the tribal council
had not used the word ”banish” or did not technically
apply the tribe’s banishment penalty so long as the
requisite conditions for habeas review were present.206
The significant requirement was the need for restrictions
on geographic movement.207

Id.; see also Lewis v. Norton, 424 F.3d 959, 963 (9th Cir.
2005). In Lewis, the plaintiff-appellants likewise sought
judicial review of a tribal membership decision. Id. at 161.
The court stated: “We agree with the district court's
conclusion that this case is deeply troubling on the level of
fundamental substantive justice. Nevertheless, we are not in
a position to modify well-settled doctrines of tribal sovereign
immunity. This is a matter in the hands of a higher authority
than our court.” Id. at 963.
204 Quair v. Sisco, No. 1:02-CV-5891 DFL, 2007 WL 1490571,
at *1 (E.D. Cal. May 21, 2007).
205 Id. at *2.
206 Id. at *3.
207 Id. (“Accordingly, the court may review the disenrollment
of petitioners under § 1303 only if it similarly affects their
geographic movement.”)
203
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That being said, habeas actions based on
disenrollment have been distinguished from all others.
Explained the court in Quair.
But courts long have recognized that the
right to define its membership is central to
a tribe's ‘existence as an independent
political community.’ Therefore, ‘the
[federal] judiciary should not rush to create
causes of action that would intrude on
these delicate matters.’ Because the Tribe's
disenrollment of Quair and Berna directly
addresses tribal membership, the court
must exercise great caution in deciding
whether § 1303 applies to these decisions
by the Tribe.208
The court ultimately determined in Quair, only
with respect to the Tribe’s decision to disenroll
Petitioners, not with respect to banishment, that it did
not have jurisdiction to resolve the habeas petition.209
Tavares v. Whitehouse is another recent case that
lies at the cross-roads of banishment and dis-enrollment.
The petitioners in Tavares were only facing partial
disenfranchisement from certain tribal events,
properties, offices, schools, health and wellness facilities,
a park and casino, but not private land within the
reservation, their own homes, or land owned by other
tribal members.210 Furthermore, the petitioners in
Tavares were temporarily excluded from these triballysponsored services, events and tribal lands, for between

208 Id. at *2 (quoting Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436
U.S. 49, 72 n.32 (1978)).
209 Id. at *3.
210 Tavares v. Whitehouse, 851 F.3d 863, 868 (9th Cir. 2017).
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two and ten years.211 It was a punishment for established
violations of tribal laws that specifically gave the Tribal
Council the power to discipline tribal members for
disseminating false or defamatory information outside
the tribe against tribal programs and/or tribal officials.212
The punishment, moreover, was established in the
Enrollment Ordinance, which provided punishment “up
to and including disenrollment” for violations of the
above-described tribal laws.213
A primary reason behind the court’s decision in
Tavares is the link between the temporary exclusion and
membership rights of tribal members. “Unlike the
Second Circuit, we distinguished between disenrollment
and banishment, and recognized that there is no federal
habeas jurisdiction over tribal membership disputes.”214
Furthermore, the court emphasized: “Because exclusion
orders are often intimately tied to community relations
and membership decisions, we cannot import an
exclusion-as-custody analysis from the ordinary habeas

Id.
Id. at 867.
213 Id.
214 Id. at 875 (citing Jeffredo v. Macarro, 599 F.3d 913, 920
(9th Cir. 2010)); see Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 72 n.32
(citations omitted) (“A tribe’s right to define its own
membership for tribal purposes has long been recognized as
central to its existence as an independent political
community. Given the often vast gulf between tribal
traditions and those with which federal courts are more
intimately familiar, the judiciary should not rush to create
causes of action that would intrude on these delicate
matters.”).
211
212
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context.”215 As the Supreme Court explained in Santa
Clara Pueblo:
A tribe's right to define its own
membership for tribal purposes has long
been recognized as central to its existence
as an independent political community.
Given the often vast gulf between tribal
traditions and those with which federal
courts are more intimately familiar, the
judiciary should not rush to create causes
of action that would intrude on these
delicate matters.216
Another primary reason, cited for the unique
deference given to tribes for membership determinations,
is the principle that “tribes have the authority to exclude
non-members from tribal land.”217 Explained the Ninth
Circuit:
If tribal exclusion orders were sufficient to
invoke habeas jurisdiction for tribal
members, there would be a significant risk
of undercutting the tribes' power because
Tavares, 851 F.3d at 876.
Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 72 n.32; see also
Shenandoah v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 159 F.3d 712, 714 (2d
Cir. 1998) (evidence of retaliatory consequences against
petitioners, including that they lost voice, lost health
insurance and access to the health center, lost quarterly
distributions, and were banned from tribal businesses and
recreational facilities and from speaking with certain other
members, was not a detention).
217 Tavares, 851 F.3d at 876 (citing Merrion v. Jicarilla
Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 144 (1982) (recognizing tribes'
authority to exclude non-members)); see also Hardin v. White
Mountain Apache Tribe, 779 F.2d 476, 479 (9th Cir. 1985).
215
216

[142]

80

Volume 14, Issue 1 (Summer 2019)
THE NEED FOR MORE EXACTING ASSESSMENT OF THE
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND SOVEREIGN INTERESTS AT STAKE
IN FEDERAL COURT INTERPRETATION OF “DETENTION”
UNDER THE INDIAN CIVIL RIGHTS ACT’S REMEDY OF
HABEAS CORPUS
14 TENN. J.L. & POL’Y 61 (2019)

‘any person,’ members and nonmembers
alike, would be able to challenge exclusion
orders through § 1303. Thus, tribal
sovereignty vis-à -vis exclusion of nonmembers would collide with habeas
jurisdiction.218
Reading Quair II together with Tavares it is
clear that it does not matter whether the tribal
government at issue uses the word “banish.” The effect
of the action against the tribal individual is what needs
to be analyzed. If the effect of the action taken restricts
geographic movement and /or causes a permanent and
total destruction of their social, cultural, and political
existence then habeas relief may be granted. This has
proven to be a very difficult standard to meet, however.
F. Land Disputes
Dry Creek Lodge is an anomalous case decided
after Santa Clara Pueblo in which the Tenth Circuit
determined there was jurisdiction under § 1303 in a case
challenging tribal action that blocked private land
owners from gaining egress to their fee simple land
located within the perimeters of the reservation.219
Petitioners, who conferred with tribal officials and
obtained a license prior to initiating the development
project, had incurred loans to build a hunting lodge on
the land in question over the objection of a neighbor who
Tavares, 851 F.3d at 876.
Dry Creek Lodge, Inc. v. Arapahoe and Shoshone Tribes,
623 F.2d 682, 685 (10th Cir. 1980).
218
219
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had interest in an allotment.220 The day after opening it,
the Tribe closed the only access road to the property in
response to the dispute involving the allottee through
whose land the road also passed.221 Efforts by petitioners
to gain access to the tribal court were denied, and the
tribal business councils refused to either consent to tribal
court jurisdiction or reverse the decision closing access to
the property, leaving petitioners with no remedies.222
Also significant was the fact that petitioners were nonmembers, indeed non-Indians.223 Their business
interests within the exterior boundaries of the
reservation were impeded by this action.224
Based on the circumstances of the case, the Tenth
Circuit upheld jurisdiction under ICRA as an exception
to Santa Clara Pueblo’s habeas requirement. The court
held: “The limitations and restrictions present in Santa
Clara Pueblo should not be applied. There has to be a
forum where the dispute can be settled.”225 It further
explained its ruling as follows:
By the decision in Santa Clara Pueblo the
tribal members seeking injunctive relief
under the Indian Civil Rights Act were in
substance directed to the remedies
available to them in their own tribal courts
and from the officials they had elected.
Much emphasis was placed in the opinion
on the availability of tribal courts and, of
course, on the intratribal nature of the
problem sought to be resolved. With the
Id. at 684
Id.
222 Id.
223 Id.
224 See id.
225 Id. at 685.
220
221
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reliance on the internal relief available the
Court
in Santa Clara places the
limitations on the Indian Civil Rights Act
as a source of a remedy. But in the absence
of such other relief or remedy the reason
for the limitations disappears.
The reason for the limitations and the
references to tribal immunity also
disappear when the issue relates to a
matter outside of internal tribal affairs
and when it concerns an issue with a nonIndian.226
Dry Creek Lodge is the only decision of its kind
insofar as it created an exception to Santa Clara Pueblo’s
requirement that the remedy of habeas corpus be the
only cause of action contained within Congress’s waiver
of sovereign immunity in ICRA.227 It is a case about tribal
interference with individual use and occupancy rights in
land.228 It suggests different standards may sometimes
be applied with respect to non-members denied
participation or access to tribal remedies.229
Significantly, however, it suggests a broader scope of
federal habeas jurisdiction in cases involving disputes
that do not present merely intratribal matters.230 This
opens a window for greater scrutiny of what is and is not

Id.
Id.
228 See id. (reviewing Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436
U.S. 49 (1978)).
229 See id.
230 See id.
226
227

[145]

83

Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy, Vol. 14, Iss. 1 [2019], Art. 1
TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
VOLUME 14 | SUMMER 2019 | ISSUE 1

a purely intratribal matter deserving of restraint in
federal review.
Despite the interpretive possibilities illuminated
in Dry Creek Lodge, however, no other court has granted
jurisdiction based upon the Dry Creek Lodge exception.
Rather, its provisions have been narrowly tailored when
invoked in other contexts. In subsequent opinions from
the Tenth Circuit, Dry Creek Lodge was interpreted as
providing federal court jurisdiction to hear claims
pursuant to §1302 “to entertain an ICRA lawsuit against
an Indian tribe if: (1) the dispute involves a non-Indian,
(2) a tribal forum is unavailable, and (3) the dispute
involves issues outside internal tribal affairs.”231 In no
Cohen v. Winkelman, 302 F. App’x 820, 823 (10th Cir.
2008) (citing Walton v. Tesuque Pueblo, 443 F.3d 1274, 1278
(10th Cir. 2006); Ordinance 59 Ass'n v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior
Sec’y, 163 F.3d 1150, 1156 (10th Cir. 1998). This three-part
understanding of Dry Creek Lodge has been recognized many
times over. See, e.g., Ute Distribution Corp. v. Ute Indian
Tribe, 149 F.3d 1260, 1266 (10th Cir. 1998) (describing Dry
Creek as “creating limited exception to tribal immunity in
ICRA cases when the dispute does not concern internal tribal
issues, the plaintiff is a non-Indian, and tribal remedies are
unavailable”); Nero v. Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma, 892
F.2d 1457, 1460 (10th Cir. 1989) (“A majority of the panel
in Dry Creek concluded that such an exception exists under
the ICRA where the dispute does not concern internal tribal
issues, the plaintiff is non-Indian, and tribal remedies are
unavailable.”); Enterprise Management Consultants, Inc. v.
United States ex rel. Hodel, 883 F.2d 890, 892 (10th Cir.
1989) (“The majority in Dry Creek Lodge articulated an
exception to the doctrine of sovereign immunity set out
in Santa Clara Pueblo, basing its decision on three factors: an
alleged violation of the Indian Civil Rights Act, the denial of a
tribal forum, and a conflict involving a matter outside internal
tribal affairs . . . The dispositive factors in Dry Creek
Lodge are absent here. We therefore affirm the dismissal of
the Tribe on the basis of its sovereign immunity from suit.”);
231
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other circumstances have these requirements been found
to be met, however. It was not applicable in a case
brought by an association of non-members seeking
enrollment in a tribe.232 The centrality of the enrollment
issue, which was the core issue in Santa Clara Pueblo
and is integral to tribes’ ability to self-govern, as well as
the fact that there was possibly another tribal forum in
which to proceed, were cited as the reasons.233 For similar
reasons, most notably the availability of a tribal forum,
the court declined to apply Dry Creek Lodge in an
employment termination suit.234 Typically, total
unavailability of a forum has been held to be essential,
not merely a tribal forum’s determination that it lacked
jurisdiction. As the Tenth Circuit held in Walton v.
Tesuque Pueblo: “A tribal court's dismissal of a suit as
barred by sovereign immunity is simply not the same
thing as having no tribal forum to hear the dispute . . .
.”235 A contrary holding, the court has concluded, would
directly conflict with Santa Clara Pueblo.236 In short:
In the nearly thirty years since that
decision, we have applied the Dry
Creek exception in only one case—Dry
Creek itself.
We
have
repeatedly
emphasized its “minimal precedential
see also Jimi Development Corp. v. Ute Mountain Ute Indian
Tribe, 930 F. Supp. 493, 496 (D. Colo. 1996); Sahmaunt v.
Horse, 593 F. Supp. 162, 164 (W.D. Okla. 1984).
232 Ordinance 59 Ass'n, 163 F.3d at 1156.
233 Id. at 1156–57.
234 Cohen, 302 F. App’x at 824.
235 Walton, 443 F.3d at 1279.
236 Cohen, 302 F. App’x at 824.
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value,”
reasoning
that
“the Dry
Creek opinion must be regarded as
requiring narrow interpretation in order to
not come into conflict with the decision of
the Supreme Court in Santa Clara.237
The Petitioners in Napoles v. Rogers, although
tribal members unlike those in Dry Creek Lodge, made
similar arguments about being forcibly and permanently
removed from lands assigned to and continuously
occupied by them and they emphasized also that their
case did not present merely an intratribal land dispute;
rather, it was a matter implicating a federal statute and
trust agreement regarding land assignments and an
intertribal land assignment ordinance implicating the
interests of three distinct tribes.238 They argued that the
conditions of confinement and physical restraint were
established both through physical geographical restraint
as well as superintendence by the tribal court. Tribal
officials cited them for trespass on multiple occasions on
their original assigned land in order to pursue an
expansion of the casino and possible hotel project. 239
Id. at 823–24 (citing Walton, 443 F.3d at 1278; Ordinance
59 Ass'n, 163 F.3d at 1158; White v. San Juan Pueblo, 728
F.2d 1307, 1312 (1984)).
238 First Amended Complaint at 30, Napoles v. Rogers, No.
1:16-cv-01933-DAD-JLT, 2017 WL 2930852 (E.D. Cal. July
10, 2017). The author represented petitioners in this action.
The district court dismissed the case for want of jurisdiction,
finding that there was not a detention sufficient under §1303.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal on the grounds of
exhaustion, referencing the pendency of new charges and
proceedings before an appellate forum that did not exist at
the time of filing of the habeas petition. 743 F. App’x 136, 136
(9th Cir. 2018).
239 First Amended Complaint at 2, Napoles v. Rogers, No.
1:16-cv-01933-DAD-JLT, 2017 WL 2930852 (E.D. Cal. July
10, 2017), aff’d, 743 F. App’x 136 (9th Cir. 2018).
237
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Armed law enforcement officials from two jurisdictions
encircled them, at times with hands on their holsters,
ordering them to physically leave the land, creating fear
for their safety and imminent arrest. 240 Additionally, the
tribal court issued pretrial orders of superintendence
banning petitioners from their land under threat of
arrest and criminal prosecution. 241 Once petitioners
were forced out, fencing was installed to prevent their reentry. 242
Napoles does not implicate disenrollment,
membership, or eligibility for tribal services, areas of
regulation that have been deemed to be core to tribal
sovereignty.
Rather, it is a case about physical,
geographical restraint and the exertion of judicial
superintendence during the pendency of trespass actions
that were initiated by tribal officials.243 Notwithstanding
the totality of the circumstances, which petitioners
argued were evidence of physical restraint similar to that
established in Poodry and Dry Creek Lodge and fell
within the line of cases like Means holding terms of
judicial superintendence to meet the criteria for
detention, the district court nonetheless dismissed the
Id. at 20–27, 29–31.
Id. at 2. Restrictions that violated other of petitioners’
rights were also imposed on them during the pendency of the
action as well, including prohibitions against possessing
firearms, weapons, or ammunition. Law enforcement from
other jurisdictions were admonished to grant full faith and
credit to the court order as well. Id. at 2, 24.
242 Id. at 26.
243 Napoles v. Rogers, No. 1:16-cv-01933-DAD-JLT, 2017 WL
2930852, at *1 (E.D. Cal. July 10, 2017), aff’d, 743 F. App’x
136 (9th Cir. 2018).
240
241
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case for want of jurisdiction.244 As with Tavares, the
district court frames its analysis with recognition of
tribal sovereignty and congressional primacy in Indian
affairs, which caution restraint in federal court
“With these
interpretation of federal statutes.245
principles in mind,” it then steps to a discussion of
detention under ICRA.246 It attributes Tavares as
significantly limiting the scope of habeas cases that may
be heard in federal court absent actual physical
restraint.247 Finally, without explaining the difference
the distinction would make with respect to tribal
sovereignty or the scope of federal review, the district
court distinguishes Poodry by likening it to a
Compare id., at *6, with Means v. Northern Cheyenne
Tribal Court, 154 F.3d 941, 949 (9th Cir. 1998) rev'd on other
grounds by United States v. Enas, 255 F.3d 662 (9th Cir.
2001); Poodry v. Tonawanda Band of Seneca Indians, 85 F.3d
874 (2d Cir. 1996); Dry Creek Lodge, Inc. v. Arapahoe and
Shoshone Tribes, 623 F.2d 682 (10th Cir. 1980).
245 Id. at *4 (“Two foundational principles guide this court’s
application of the statute: the concepts of “tribal sovereignty
and congressional primacy in Indian affairs.” (citing Tavares,
851 F.3d at 869)).
246 Id.
247 Stated the district court: “While the Ninth Circuit had
earlier suggested agreement with the decision in Poodry to
the extent it found that § 1303 requires ‘a severe actual or
potential restraint on liberty,’ the decision in Tavares now
makes it abundantly clear that any extension of ‘detention’
under § 1303 beyond actual physical custody must be
narrowly construed by courts of this circuit. Indeed, the
banishment at issue in Tavares was found insufficient to
constitute detention—despite the fact that it barred the
petitioners from entering any tribal land, including their own
homes—because it was only temporary, lasting for ten years
for some of the petitioners and two years for others.” Id. at *5
(quoting Jeffredo v. Macarro, 599 F.3d 913, 919 (9th Cir.
2010)).
244
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denationalization case, in contrast to what they suggest
in Napoles was at root a takings case.248
Id. at *6, (“In Poodry, the Second Circuit found permanent
banishment and disenrollment sufficient to constitute
detention because it analogized such actions to the stripping
of citizenship in denaturalization and denationalization
proceedings. That is quite dissimilar from what is alleged by
petitioners here, which more closely resembles a takings
claim than a denaturalization or denationalization.
Petitioners cite no authority, and the court has identified
none, suggesting that § 1303 gives federal courts sitting in
habeas the jurisdiction to resolve intra-tribal land ownership
disputes.” (citing Poodry, 85 F.3d at 895–96)).
Significantly, Congress did include a takings clause in
ICRA’s substantive provisions, but not expressly
denationalization, 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(5) (2012) (“No Indian
tribe, in exercising powers of self-government shall . . . take
any private property for a public use without just
compensation.”). Moreover, and this goes beyond the scope of
this paper but underscores the willingness of many federal
courts to neglect careful consideration of the specific facts and
ways in which federal review might further or undermine
Congressional objectives, petitioners argued in this case that
the land dispute underlying the rights violations was an
inter-tribal, not intra-tribal, governed by a federal trust
agreement and governing body and authority comprised of
representatives from three tribes. For a description of that
arrangement, see Ordinance Governing Land Assignments
on the Bishop, Big Pine and Lone Pine Reservations (1962)
(“By the Trust Agreement for Relief and Rehabilitation Grant
to Unorganized Bands, [] (Hereinafter referred to as the
‘Trust Agreement), approved April 17, 1939, by the Acting
Commissioner of Indian Affairs, the governing body titled
Trustees for the Owens Valley Board Paiute-Shoshone
Indians, (Hereinafter referred to as the Owens Valley Board
248
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The Ninth Circuit did not reach either the merits of
the rights violation or the issue of whether there had
been a detention sufficient to invoke the court’s
jurisdiction under § 1303. The dismissal was on the
grounds of exhaustion, requiring petitioners to continue
on in tribal appellate proceedings involving new trespass
charges filed during the pendency of the federal habeas
proceeding and a tribal appellate court that did not exist
at the time of filing.249 It did not explain how the tribal
of Trustees), was created and recognized. The purpose of
creating and recognizing the Owens Valley Board of Trustees
was to receive and administer funds appropriated under the
Emergency Relief Appropriation Act of 1938 for and on behalf
of the Owens Valley Paiute-Shoshone Indians, under the
direction and approval of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs.
It was to this recognized governing body and their successors
in office that the Commissioner granted and conveyed the
said funds in Trust, subject to specified conditions stated in
the Trust Agreement. Therefore, the recognized governing
body of the Owens Valley Indian Bands is the Owens Valley
Board of Trustees.”).
249 See Napoles v. Rogers, 743 F. App’x 136, 136–37 (9th Cir.
2018). Petitioners prevailed before the tribal court of appeals
in the tribal council’s first effort to have them trespassed from
the land in question. Bishop Paiute Tribal Council v. Bouch,
B-AP-1412-6-12 (Intertribal Ct. S. Cal. C.A. Nov. 2, 2015), on
reh’g, Opinion (Intertribal Ct. S. Cal. C.A. June 1, 2016). The
tribal appellate court reversed the convictions and remanded
for further proceedings regarding the status of the land in
question. On remand, rather than receive more evidence on
the issue, however, the tribal court dismissed the case with
prejudice. Order of Dismissal at 3, Bishop Tribal Council v.
Bouch, No. BT-CV-TP-2014-0045 (Bishop Paiute Tribal Ct.
Oct. 28, 2016) (Case nos. BT-CV-TP-2014-0045; BT-CV-TP2014-0047; BT-CV-TP-2014-0048; BT-CV-TP-2014-0049; BTCV-TP-0050;
BT-CV-TP-2014-0051;
BT-CV-TP-0052).
Following the initial court of appeals decisions,
representatives of the tribal council and court also cancelled
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their contract with the Southern California Intertribal Court
of Appeals, who the tribe had retained as their court of
appeals at the time of the first trespass action and appeal.
First Amended Petition, Napoles v. Rogers, No. 1:16-cv01933-DAD-JLT at 25–26. Thereafter, when petitioners
attempted to enter upon their land, the tribe filed a second
trespass action and issued the orders and actions that were
at issue in the case of Napoles v. Rogers ultimately before the
Ninth Circuit. Id. at 18–21. Believing the charges to be
precluded by the decisions in the first trespass action and
without an appellate court to raise their objections and new
rights violations, petitioners sought relief under ICRA in the
form of the habeas corpus petition. Id. The circumstances
existing at this time were the ones that formed the basis for
the district court’s decision in Napoles v. Rogers, No. 1:16-cv01933-DAD-JLT, 2017 WL 2930852, at *1 (E.D. Cal. July 10,
2017), aff’d, 743 F. App’x 136 (9th Cir. 2018).
At the time of filing of their habeas petition, petitioners had
exhausted all available tribal remedies. First Amended
Complaint at 2, Napoles v. Rogers, No. 1:16-cv-01933-DADJLT, 2017 WL 2930852 (E.D. Cal. July 10, 2017), aff’d, 743 F.
App’x 136 (9th Cir. 2018). There was no appellate remedy
available, the appellate court having been disbanded and not
yet re-constituted. See id. at 28 (in the first amended
complaint, the parties stated “it is unlikely an alternative
forum will be constituted prior to Respondents’ advancing the
development project to the construction phase.”). However,
during the pendency of this case, tribal officials appointed
new judges to a court of appeals, once again dismissed the
charges that were pending at the time of the filing of the
habeas petition, and filed a third set of virtually identical
trespass charges against petitioners. It was this third set of
charges that were pending (and before a panel of appellate
judges that did not exist at the time of the filing of the original
habeas case) at the time of the oral argument in the appeal
before the Ninth Circuit. The Ninth Circuit, nonetheless,
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respondents’ creation of new remedies and legal actions
during the pendency of the action, effectively
circumventing those that existed at the time of filing, fit
within the principles of exhaustion typically applied.
In fact, federal court jurisdiction is generally
established as long as the petitioners are in custody when
the petition for writ of habeas corpus is filed.250 “The
tribal exhaustion rule is based on ‘principles of comity’
and is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to review.”251 It is
a prudential, not jurisdictional, consideration with
numerous exceptions to its application.252 Given the
concluded: “Because an appeal is pending in tribal court
regarding the subject of Plaintiffs’ § 1303 habeas claim,
Plaintiffs have not exhausted their tribal remedies and the
district court did not have jurisdiction.” Napoles v. Rogers,
743 F. App’x 136, 137 (9th Cir. 2018) (citing Jeffredo, 599 F.3d
at 918).
250 See Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 238 (1968) (internal
citations omitted). A brief discussion of exhaustion is
included in this article to the extent it plays a role in the cases
on “detention” under § 1303. However, the nuances of
exhaustion and related justiciability doctrines like mootness
in the context of tribal habeas cases demand their own
inquiry that lie beyond the scope of this paper.
251 Valenzuela v. Smith, 699 F.3d 1199, 1206 (10th Cir. 2012)
(citing Burrell v. Armijo, 456 F.3d 1159, 1168 (10th Cir.
2006)).
252 In the words of the Supreme Court: “[E]xhaustion [is] not
required where ‘an assertion of tribal court jurisdiction is
motivated by a desire to harass or is conducted in bad faith,
or where the action is patently violative of express
jurisdictional prohibitions, or where exhaustion would be
futile because of the lack of adequate opportunity to challenge
the court's jurisdiction.” Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480
U.S. 9, 19 n.12 (1987) (quoting Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. Cos.
v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 856 n.21 (1985)). For
example, a number of cases have held that “if a functioning
appellate court does not exist, exhaustion is per se futile.”
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circumstances of the case in Napoles and the arguments
presented by the parties, which focused predominantly
on the issue of detention, a better approach would have
been to conduct a more exacting review of the exhaustion
doctrine prior to dismissing the case on those grounds.253
The final disposition of the case, thus, may be construed
as another example of a federal court summarily
disposing of jurisdiction under ICRA without the depth of
analysis warranted under the Act that is necessary to

Johnson v. Gila River Indian Cmty., 174 F.3d 1032, 1036 (9th
Cir. 1999) (citing Krempel v. Prairie Island Indian
Cmty., 125 F.3d 621, 622 (8th Cir. 1997) (exhaustion of tribal
remedies is not required when no functioning court existed at
the time the original complaint was filed in district court)).
See also Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Driving Hawk, 534 F.2d 98
(8th Cir. 1976). Exhaustion is not required, moreover, where
an assertion of tribal jurisdiction “is motivated by a desire to
harass or is conducted in bad faith,” or where it would
be futile. Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. Cos., 471 U.S. at 857 n.21
(1985) (quoting Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 338 (1977)).
Neither must there be exhaustion if it would “serve no
purpose other than delay.” Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353,
369 (2001) (quoting Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438,
459 n.14 (1997).
253 For example, and as advocated unsuccessfully by
petitioners, if the court had concerns about exhaustion, a
better approach would have been to reverse the district
court’s order of dismissal and remand the case for
development of the record, as the court did in Dry v. CFR
Court of Indian Offenses for the Choctaw Nation, 168 F.3d
1207 (10th Cir. 1999). See Napoles, 2017 WL 2930852, at *4
n.6.
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guarantee protection of the individual rights as well as
the interests of the sovereign.254
G. Miscellaneous Circumstances Which Have
Been Held NOT to Meet the Standard for
Habeas Review
Aside from the circumstances described above,
habeas petitions under ICRA have been filed and denied
in a variety of other circumstances. Jurisdiction over
challenges to election have been denied.255 As explained
by one court:
The author recognizes that her role as an advocate for
individuals and the impacts she has observed first-hand
when rights are violated and there is no external redress
likely has an influential effect on her response to these cases.
Additionally, she acknowledges that the issue of exhaustion
and justiciability lie beyond the scope of this article.
However, her main point is that tribal sovereignty and selfdetermination as well as individual rights, both of which are
critical to the sustained ability of indigenous people to
exercise self-governance, warrant more exacting analysis of
the actual interests of the tribe and actions of its officials and
the way in which these interests and actions would be
impacted by federal review or abstention. It is not enough to
simply make general pronouncements of sovereignty and cut
straight to a conclusion of abstention.
255 See, e.g., Lewis v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 584 F.
App’x 804, 805 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding Tribe's refusal to
permit petitioner to run for election to the Tribal Council was
not a sufficiently severe restraint on his liberty to constitute
custody as it “does not create a deprivation of liberty similar
to the types of infringement on personal movement
previously recognized as establishing federal habeas corpus
jurisdiction.”); Scudero v. Moran, 230 F. Supp. 3d 980, 985 (D.
Alaska 2017) (costs imposed on unsuccessful candidate for
unsuccessfully challenging election results did not constitute
a detention even if it were possible for him to lose his right to
254
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A tribe's right to define the qualifications
for an office within the tribal government
is similar to its right to define its own
membership—it is central to a tribe's
“existence as an independent political
community.” Likewise, the administrative
procedures put in place to determine
whether
an applicant
meets
the
qualifications for tribal office are equally
important
to
a
tribe's
political
independence and sovereignty.256
So too were purely monetary fines for unlawful
logging;257 revocation of a vending permit at a flea
market;258 temporary suspension of license to practice as

vote as a result of being levied and not paying said costs; “the
loss of one's ‘voice’ in a tribal community is insufficient to
provide the necessary jurisdiction.”).
256 Lewis v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, No. CV-12-8073PCT-SRB (DKD), 2013 WL 510111, at *6 (D. Ariz. Jan. 24)
(citing Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 72 n.32), report and
recommendation adopted by No. CV-12-8073-PCT-SRB
(DKD), 2013 WL 530551 (D. Ariz. Feb. 12, 2013), aff’d, 584 F.
App’x 136 (9th Cir. 2014).
257 Moore v. Nelson, 270 F.3d 789, 791 (9th Cir. 2001) (purely
monetary fine for unlawful logging does not constitute a
detention).
258 Walton v. Tesque Pueblo, 443 F.3d 1274, 1279 (10th Cir.
2006) (footnote omitted) (holding that the revocation of a flea
market vendor's license to do business at a tribal flea market
was insufficient to satisfy ICRA's custody requirement, nor
did it fall within the Dry Creek exception).
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an advocate in tribal court;259 termination and
replacement of employment;260 and selective enforcement
of an ordinance permitting inspection and demolishing of
houses.261 Also inadequate was a suit challenging
disenrollment and eviction from federally-funded leaseto-own housing in retaliation for petitioners’ opposing a
tribal council candidate during an election cycle was
insufficient.262 Similarly a tribal member who was
Poulson v. Tribal Court for the Ute Indian Tribe, Civ. No.
2:12-CV-497 BSJ, 2013 WL 1367045, at *2 (D. Utah Apr. 4,
2013) (suspension as lay advocates insufficient).
260 Payer v. Turtle Mountain Tribal Council, No. A4-03-105,
2003 WL 22339181, at *5 (D.N.D. Oct. 1, 2003) (termination
and replacement of their roles by tribal council members from
school where they served as elected board members and grant
administrators after securing $29 million in federal funding
did not constitute a detention; even where council terminated
tribal judge who reinstated petitioners and punished another
for attempting to enforce that order, tribal court was their
only forum in which to seek remedy).
261 Shenandoah v. Halbritter, 366 F.3d 89, 92 (2d Cir. 2004)
(allegedly selective enforcement of an ordinance permitting
inspection and demolishing of houses of those who dissented
from and claimed harassment and intimidation by tribal
leaders was an economic harm, not a restraint of liberty
sufficient to invoke ICRA’s habeas provision).
262 Quitiquit v. Robinson Rancheria Citizens Business
Council, No. C 11-0983 PJH, 2011 WL 2607172, at *8 (N.D.
Cal. July 1, 2011) (“Under Jeffredo, the court lacks
jurisdiction under the ICRA to review an order of
disenrollment, and the eviction order, which resulted from
the ruling in the unlawful detainer action, does not serve to
transform the disenrollment into a punitive ‘banishment.’” In
addition, as respondents argue, unlawful detainer is
a civil action brought pursuant to state law, and it does not
provide a basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction.”); see
also Round Valley Indian Hous. Auth. v. Hunter, 907 F.
Supp. 1343, 1348 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
259
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domiciled off the reservation was not detained for the
purposes of §1303 by virtue of being banned from
entering tribal businesses and offices – except the court
and health center.263
Efforts by tribal officials to retaliate against tribal
court advocates or judges who advocated for or made
rulings favorable to individuals who challenged tribal
officials or action have been determined to fall short of
the standard as well.264 Suits by descendants of slaves
owned by Cherokee Indian Nation and freed by 1866
treaty alleging violation of constitutional and statutory
provisions from denial of their right to vote in tribal
elections
and
right
to
participate
in
federal Indian benefits programs have been held not to
present grounds for habeas jurisdiction under ICRA.265
Altogether, some very serious rights violations have
occurred and will continue to occur with no means of
redress due to the unavailability of tribal remedies and

Mitchell v. Seneca Nation, No. 12-CV-119-A, 2013 WL
1337299, at *1, *4 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2013). The court
determined that the primary impact was economic; however,
even cultural and social impacts acknowledged by the court
were not enough. Id. at *4. According to the court, “barring
access to Nation buildings is not a restraint severe enough to
permit habeas corpus review.” Id.
264 Oviatt v. Reynolds, No. 17-4124, 2018 WL 2094505, at *1,
*3 (10th Cir. May 7, 2018) (tribal court advocates did not
establish basis for detention where they were banned from
court services, tribal offices, courts, family services but there
was no indication of permanent banishment).
265 Nero v. Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma, 892 F.2d 1457,
1458, 1461 (10th Cir. 1989); Wheeler v. Swimmer, 835 F.2d
259, 261 (10th Cir. 1987).
263
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restrictions in federal court interpretations of detention
under
§ 1303.
V. The Evolution of ICRA Under Federal Court
Review
A. Revisiting Congress’ Expressed Goals
Congress enacted the Indian Civil Rights Act at a
time in American history where concern for civil rights
was of pressing and nationwide concern. As Congress
investigated the issue of Indian civil rights generally,
including their rights with respect to state, federal, and
local government officials, a clear picture emerged that
some of the greatest civil rights violations occurred at the
hands of tribal officials.266 A variety of factors contributed
to the denial or abridgement of Indian civil rights,
including the “budgetary distress” and “paucity of
resources” which could be allocated to law enforcement,
legal counsel or tribal court development, the prohibition
of trained lawyers and/or staffing of tribal courts with lay
judges, compulsory testimony of defendants, and judges
serving dual or multiple roles as trial and appellate
judges or council members and judges.267 Abuse of power
by tribal councils and its relation also in many
circumstances to harassment and discrimination based
on religious affiliation also “appeared to manifest more
than budgetary distress.”268
What is clear about the act’s enactment is that
Congress intended to formally recognize and provide
some form of federal remedy for violations of the

See Burnett, supra note 32, at 584–88.
Id. at 581–82.
268 Id.
266
267
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enumerated rights set forth in § 1302.269 However, the
federal courts have exerted extraordinary and limiting
influence over the scope and enforceability of ICRA.
In the first cases filed after ICRA’s enactment and
in keeping with what seems to be the clearest picture of
Congress’s original intent, federal jurisdiction over all
kinds of civil and criminal actions was widely
acknowledged under the basic federal jurisdictional
statutes for federal question and civil rights cases.
Federal courts, in that iteration of interpreting the Act,
performed the balancing of interests, by and large,
through weighing of the seriousness of the particular
alleged rights violation and the extent to which the
standard
under
Anglo-American
constitutional
interpretations differed from those in the tribal
context.270 It was and continues to be widely
acknowledged that “[j]udicial sensitivity is especially
important in the area of Indian civil rights.”271 As noted
by the United States Commission on Civil Rights shortly
after its passage: “In enforcing the act, the courts will
have the serious responsibility of drawing a balance
between respect for individual rights and respect for
Indian custom and tradition. Many important questions
. . . will not be answered until the courts have settled
them.”272

See id. at 577 (discussing the “constitutional neglect which
Senator Ervin was determined to remedy” when Congress
held hearings in 1963 and 1965).
270 See supra notes 41–52 and accompanying text.
271 Burnett, supra note 32, at 557.
272 Id. (citing U.S. Comm’n on Civil Rights, American Indian
Civil Rights Handbook 11 (1972)).
269
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However, as discussed above, beginning in 1978
with the Supreme Court’s decision in Santa Clara
Pueblo, a severe change to this method of balancing
occurred. The first and most radical step was to
determine that ICRA waived sovereign immunity only in
the context of § 1303’s habeas provision, meaning a
deprivation of rights had to be so severe that it deprived
the individual of his or her liberty before the courts would
review the violations.273 In addition to that, the Court
emphasized for the first time not one, but two distinct
purposes of ICRA: specifically, "preventing injustices
perpetrated by tribal governments, on the one hand, and,
on the other, avoiding undue or precipitous interference
in the affairs of the Indian people."274 In other words,
explained the court: “Two distinct and competing
purposes are manifest in the provisions of the ICRA: In
addition to its objective of strengthening the position of
individual tribal members vis-a-vis the tribe, Congress
also intended to promote the well-established federal
‘policy of furthering Indian self-government.’”275 With
respect to the goals of furthering Indian self-government,
the Court was concerned that it not interfere with a
tribe’s ability to maintain itself as a culturally and
politically distinct entity, acknowledging that tribal
forums might be in a better position to evaluate matters
of custom and tradition than federal courts.276 This
balancing is what led the court to render its
determination that habeas was the only federal
remedy.277

Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 59 (1978).
Id. at 67–68 (citation omitted).
275 Id. at 62 (quoting Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551
(1974); Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382, 391 (1976)).
276 Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 62, 70.
277 Id. at 66.
273
274
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While the limiting strictures of Santa Clara
Pueblo widely have been accepted as binding, its
determination that federal jurisdiction was foreclosed
except when a detention sufficient to invoke the court’s
habeas jurisdiction was present is not necessarily born
out in the legislative history. It is true that early versions
of the legislation provided for direct appeal of all tribal
court criminal convictions with trial de novo available on
appeal.278 This was presented as an expansion of the
habeas remedy articulated in the case of Colliflower v.
Garland.279 However, the criminal jurisdiction of tribal
courts was but one of many sources of rights violations
identified by Congress. Other early bills considered the
scope of the substantive rights that should be
protected,280 authorization of the U.S. Attorney General
to investigate and prosecute civil rights violations in
which Indian civil rights were involved,281 provisions for
the development of a new model code for the courts of
Indian offenses and tribal courts,282 provisions aimed at
addressing
inadequate
law
enforcement
and
recommending concurrent federal jurisdiction in some
states who failed to perform their law enforcement duties

S. 962, 89th Cong. (1965); see also Burnett, supra note 32,
at 592–93.
279
Burnett, supra note 41, at 592 n.201 (citing Colliflower v.
Garland, 342 F.2d 369 (9th Cir. 1965)).
280
S. 961, 89th Cong. (1965); Burnett, supra note 32, at 589–
92.
281
S. 963, 89th Cong. (1965); Burnett, supra note 32, at 594–
95.
282
S. 964, 89th Cong. (1965); Burnett, supra note 32, at 595–
96.
278
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under Public Law 280,283 and resolutions aimed at
revising administrative practices of the Department of
Interior related to attorney contracts and organization of
legal materials related to Indian treaties, laws, executive
orders, and regulations.284
Some tribes presented testimony raising concern
about the trial de novo on appeal, financial burdens
related to the need to hire tribal prosecutors.285 The
Department of the Interior and Bureau of Indian Affairs
(BIA) registered objection to the direct appeal as well in
nominal deference to the Department’s appellate
authority over federally established courts of Indian
offenses; they urged federal appeal of reservation court
decisions only and upon the full exhaustion of all
administrative remedies. 286
In the final versions, the substantive rights
provision in S. 961 remained largely intact and S. 962
was amended to permit appeals of criminal convictions to
federal court through the writ of habeas corpus, not trial
de novo.287 The primary concern about de novo review of
all criminal convictions by tribal courts apparently was
fear that it would precipitate “intolerable strain on the
district courts, already suffering from a chronic overload
of cases.”288 Federal review itself was not an issue—
indeed, that arguably was what was desired by way of
relief at the time of ICRA’s drafting —nor was there an
express concern related to deference to tribal
sovereignty. There is little specific discussion in the
S. 965., 89th Cong. (1965); S. 966, 89th Cong. (1965); S.
967, 89th Cong. (1965); Burnett, supra note 41, at 596–99.
284
S. 968, 89th Cong. (1965); S.J. Res. 40, 89th Cong. (1965);
Burnett, supra note 32, at 599–601.
285 Burnett, supra note 32, at 593.
286 Id. at 593–94.
287 Id. at 602–04.
288 Id. at 602 n.240.
283
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legislative record illuminating the versions of the bill
that included the habeas provision and how the remedy
of habeas was to be viewed with respect to the direct de
novo appeal option which was ultimate rejected, aside
from the reference to the Colliflower case itself, which
was a habeas case.289 There is surely no indication
anywhere in the record that habeas was intended to limit
federal review with respect to all categories of rights
violations, just those accompanying criminal convictions.
It is also not clear what Congress understood about what
exactly was intended as a precipitating condition for the
filing of habeas in those criminal cases. It was the trial
de novo, not review itself, that was the concern in the
legislative debate;290 and the details of how that would be
redressed are not spelled out.
Also significant is the fact that the proposal in S.
963 to permit Attorney General investigation and
prosecution of rights violations was removed from the
final version in response to opposition by tribal
leadership and Department of the Interior.291 This left
See supra note 121.
See Burnett, supra note 32, at 593.
291 Id. at 603. Many who presented on behalf of tribes favored
this requirement, as it addressed issues of abuse by state and
local law enforcement and courts as well. However, leaders of
some tribes, including the Pueblos of New Mexico who were
very vocal in the opposition objected, stating: “We
understand, better than non-Indians, the background and
traditions which shape Indian conduct and thinking, and we
do not want so important a matter to be tried by those who
are not familiar with them.” Id. at 594 (citing 1965 Senate
Hearings, supra note 124, at 352–53). The Department of the
Interior wanted to maintain control and screening over
289
290
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enforcement exclusively in the hands of those whose
rights had been violated. Arguably, then, this lends
further support to an intent by Congress to provide a
more expansive scope of jurisdictional authority to
address alleged violations of the substantive rights
spelled out in ICRA.
The place where the tribes’ unique cultural and
sovereign attributes were considered was with regard to
which substantive rights would be recognized. Initially,
equal protection was omitted in deference to tribes’
unique cultural values that may diverge from the AngloAmerican vision of what must be equal between persons.
Some tribes claimed not to be affected by any proposed
substantive rights, as they had already adopted
constitutions that virtually replicated the U.S.
Constitution.292 Others indicated they were financially
and psychologically unprepared to incorporate these
changes. “At the other extreme were the Pueblos, who
were determined to maintain their closed and traditional
societies.”293 Representatives of the Department of
Interior and BIA and some attorneys acknowledged the
various ways in which tribes were situated with respect
to constitutional rights and recommended enumerating
certain rights and leaving out others, rather than

complaints and determine which ones got forwarded to the
justice department. Id. at 595.
292 Id. at 589 (citing 1965 Senate Hearings, supra note 124,
at 325).
293 Id. at 589. Stated one tribal representative: “We have long
held to our tradition of tribal courts and we have our own
codes. Naturally, we are familiar with the special conditions
existing in our various communities, and the status of
sovereignty which we have always enjoyed has made us
dedicated to the task of preserving it.” Id. (citing 1965 Senate
Hearings, supra note 124, at 352).
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imposing the full constitutional requirements.294 This
became the prevailing vision and one ultimately accepted
by Congress. Some rights were omitted such as the
establishment of religion clause, right to grand jury,
right to counsel at tribe’s expense, right to jury in civil
cases, and Fifteenth Amendment.295 Those omitted, by
and large, were out of consideration of the financial
burden it would impose on already impoverished tribes
with a few, like the establishment clause prohibition out
of deference to unique cultural and traditional norms
where government and beliefs were not necessarily
separated.296
Other rights were expressly enumerated, and that
is the approach ultimately embraced by Congress. One
interesting development was that the Department of
Interior submitted a proposal that included the privilege
of habeas corpus in a list of other enumerated rights,
including the right to jury trial in certain criminal cases,
First Amendment rights, protection from search and
seizure, right to confront witnesses, right to counsel at
individuals’ own expense, prohibition against ex post fact
laws, excessive bail or fines, and the right to equal
protection.297 This also supports an interpretation that
the habeas provision was, indeed, a concession limited to
the arena of appeals of criminal convictions, not the
exclusive remedy intended by Congress for violations of
294Id.

at 590 (citing 1965 Senate Hearings, supra note 124, at
317–18).
295 See Burnett, supra note 41, at 591–92 (discussing the bill
substitutes that preceded the ICRA),
296 See id. (discussing the reasons for S. 961, 89th Cong.
(1965)).
297 1965 Senate Hearings, supra note 124, at 318.
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all the other enumerated rights. Based upon this
legislative history, therefore, the Court’s decision in
Santa Clara Pueblo reflects in the name of tribal
sovereignty a much more restrictive scope of federal
jurisdictional authority over ICRA than what was
envisioned by Congress.
The manner in which federal courts decided
alleged ICRA violations in the first ten years after its
enactment further underscores this understanding.298
Relief was granted in a number of areas, outside the
context of habeas, challenging issues arising in elections,
with expression of speech, and other non-custodial
matters.299 The courts tailored the enumerated rights of
ICRA to the unique customs, tradition and cultural
norms of each tribe, and interpretative rules emerged
with regard to the substantive provisions of the Act.300
Physical custody was not a requirement to gain redress
in federal court. As summarized in 1979, in proximity to
the date of those decisions: “The infringement on tribal
sovereignty has been mitigated by recent judicial
decisions that use tribal customs and traditions as the
basis for interpreting the ICRA.”301
Also significant in framing Santa Clara Pueblo is
legislative advocacy that took place not during but after
the actual enactment of ICRA. After its passage, a
number of tribes objected, and an amendment to ICRA
was proposed by the National Council of Tribal

See discussion and authority supra Section I(A).
Id.
300 Id.
301 Judy D. Lynch, Note, Indian Sovereignty and Judicial
Interpretations of the Indian Civil Rights Act, 1979 WASH. U.
L. Q. 897, 918 (1979).
298
299
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Chairmen.302 “The resolution stated that the ICRA
violates the principle of self-government associated with
Indian tribes because courts have construed the Act as
granting federal courts jurisdiction over issues such as
the right to membership in a tribe, the operation of tribal
elections, the selection of tribal officials, and the right to
conduct tribal governmental business."303 The proposed
amendment would have limited ICRA’s applicability to
members of any tribe, bands, or groups “which has
consented to the provisions of this subchapter by an
affirmative vote of the adult members of the tribe, band,
or other group of Indians in an election called by the
Secretary of the Interior for that purpose.”304 This
amendment did not pass, however, leaving ICRA and its
impacts on sovereignty and independence in place as
originally enacted. This advocacy initiative and
Congress’ response to it is telling because it
demonstrates the extent to which the original ICRA
intended to provide a remedy regardless of particular
tribes’ or tribal leaders’ consent or desire to be guided by
its principles.
In the wake of this failed legislative amendment,
some federal courts did make efforts to infuse
interpretations of ICRA with more consideration of tribal
tradition, culture, and governance processes. However,
federal jurisdiction to review claims was widely
exercised, the limitations being construed in the form of
302 See Resolution Adopted by N.T.C.A. at National Meeting,
December 5-8, 1973, Phoenix, Arizona, 1 INDIAN L. REP. 1.
63–65 (1974) [hereinafter Resolution].
303 Lynch, supra note 301, at 912 (citing Resolution, supra
note 302, at 63–65).
304 Id. (citing Resolution, supra note 302, at 63–65).
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interpretations of substantive rights.305 In those cases
where rights violations were found to have occurred,
despite efforts at interpretations that resonated with
cultural norms, federal courts regularly made
declaratory judgments and enjoined tribal officials from
persisting with the rights violations. For example, a
number of federal district courts required tribal courts to
permit legal representation by licensed lawyers.306
Some courts even authorized civil actions for
damages against tribal officials who violated enumerated
rights so long as such claims were brought in conjunction
with an action for equitable or habeas corpus relief with
which it shared a “common nucleus of operative fact.”307
However, both equitable and habeas remedies were
clearly and widely understood to be authorized under
ICRA in order to address enumerated rights violations.
“The 1968 legislation has been interpreted to empower
federal courts to decide cases not previously heard by the
tribal courts or brought to federal courts by habeas
corpus, to apply developing fourth and fifth amendment
concepts, and to allow damage actions not authorized by
the statute.”308
Thus, although its ruling dramatically limited the
scope of relief available, Santa Clara Pueblo gives
Id. at 912–15 (internal citations omitted); see also
discussion supra Section I.
306 Burnett, supra note 32, at 619 (footnotes omitted).
307 See, e.g., Spotted Eagle v. Blackfeet Tribe, 301 F. Supp.
85, 91 (D. Mont. 1969) (citing and analogizing to United Mine
Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966) (holding that
federal courts may exercise pendent jurisdiction in damage
claims arising under state law as long as there is a ‘common
nucleus of operative fact’ with federal claims that are
properly before the court)); see also Burnett, supra note 32, at
618–19.
308 Burnett, supra note 32, at 618–19.
305

[170]

108

Volume 14, Issue 1 (Summer 2019)
THE NEED FOR MORE EXACTING ASSESSMENT OF THE
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND SOVEREIGN INTERESTS AT STAKE
IN FEDERAL COURT INTERPRETATION OF “DETENTION”
UNDER THE INDIAN CIVIL RIGHTS ACT’S REMEDY OF
HABEAS CORPUS
14 TENN. J.L. & POL’Y 61 (2019)

meaning, not to Congress’s intent itself, but to a vision of
tribal sovereignty and the need for federal restraint in
the review of alleged tribal rights violations that gained
ascendancy after ICRA’s enactment, and it does so in the
face of tribal advocacy and proposed legislative reform
that Congress rejected during and after ICRA’s passage.
The Court’s impact on the enforceability of ICRA’s
substantive rights was substantial. Although tribes were
not required to consent to ICRA’s provisions before it
could be applied, all remedies but those remaining under
§ 1303’s habeas provision were foreclosed. This created a
dramatic gap between the rights Congress set forth as
deserving of protection, and the redress actually
available to enforce them. As set forth above, neither the
plain language nor legislative history of the act, or its
interpretation by the federal courts in the ten years
following the act, actually supports this determination;
and it marks a devastating limitation on ICRA’s efficacy
in the recognition and enforcement of its substantive
rights.
B. Even the Availability of Habeas has been
Diminished by the Federal Courts in Ways
that Thwart Congressional Intent
Although Santa Clara Pueblo still left room for
federal review in situations where a detention sufficient
to invoke habeas review existed, the majority of lower
court decisions since Santa Clara Pueblo have tilted the
balance against federal review of ICRA claims even
further. The result has greatly curtailed the
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enforceability of ICRA, except in the most extreme and
unique of circumstances.309
One way this has occurred is through the federal
courts expressly weighting tribal sovereignty more
heavily than individuals’ substantive rights to redress in
the assessment of whether there is a detention under §
1303. Congress incorporated tribal sovereignty and selfdetermination concerns in its articulation of which
enumerated rights would be included in ICRA.310 Santa
Clara Pueblo itself justified its foreclosing of equitable
and declaratory remedies as stemming from the critical
goal of deference to tribal sovereignty.311 In doing to, the
Court considered certain sovereign interests of the Santa
Clara Pueblo, one of the tribes most resistant to ICRA.312
The Santa Clara Pueblo was one of the tribes that
advocated for amendments not ultimately embraced by
Congress, in the distinctive area of enrollment and
membership, which are core sovereign interests.313 The
case itself is about the tribe’s membership rules that
excluded children of mothers who married outside the
tribe but not fathers.
As with Santa Clara Pueblo, many decisions, like
those of Poodry and Tavares, have noted the unique
importance of deferring to tribes in certain matters of
exercising sovereignty,
including circumstances
implicating enrollment and membership and many other
See supra note 139.
Supra notes 271–98 and accompanying text.
311 Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 60 (1978).
312 See, e.g., 1965 Senate Hearings, supra note 124, at 353–54
(detailing tribe opposition to the bills preceding the ICRA,
including opposition from a representative from the Santa
Clara Pueblo).
313 For an in-depth discussion of tribal membership and its
link to significance to tribal sovereignty, see Painter-Thorne,
supra note 168.
309
310
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interests.314 A distinct problem with many of these
decisions, however, is that the courts often quickly and
summarily reject jurisdiction on the grounds of deference
to tribal sovereignty without sufficient analysis of the
particular sovereign interests, how they should be
construed and weighted in light of other tribal and
individual interests, and how they actually may be
impacted in a given case.315 Although hundreds of cases
have been filed seeking relief under ICRA, jurisdiction
has only been granted since Santa Clara Pueblo in a few
very narrow circumstances: in a criminal case where an
individual is actively incarcerated316; in a situation
where an individual has been charged with an offense,
incarceration is a possibility, and the court has exercised
superintendence before or after conviction317; in two
instances
of
banishment
unaccompanied
by

Tavares v. Whitehouse, 851 F.3d 863, 877–78 (9th Cir.
2017); Poodry v. Tonawnda Band of Seneca Indians, 85 F.3d
874, 897 (2d Cir. 1996) (citing Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S.
at 55–56).
315 See, e.g., supra notes 108–113 and accompanying text;
supra notes 242–47 and accompanying text.
316 See, e.g., Garcia v. Rivas, No. 15-cv-337 MCA/SCY, 2016
WL 10538197, at *7 (D.N.M. Mar. 11), report and
recommendation adopted by No. 15-377 MCA/SCY, 2016 WL
10538196 (D.N.M. Apr. 12, 2016) (granting habeas for a tribal
member who had been incarcerated for longer than the 6-year
permitted of his sentence).
317 See, e.g., Means v. Northern Cheyenne Tribal Court, 154
F.3d 941, 949 (9th Cir. 1998) rev'd on other grounds
by United States v. Enas, 255 F.3d 662 (9th Cir. 2001).
314
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disenrollment318; and in the Dry Creek Lodge situation,
an exception which has never been re-applied.319
Moreover, in addition to narrowing the grounds for
habeas jurisdiction, courts often invoke other doctrines,
such as exhaustion or mootness, further restricting the
circumstances where a federal court will actually review
the merits of individual’s rights violations. For example,
even in the face of serious deprivations of rights where
custodial circumstances are present, a number of federal
courts have been inclined to summarily dismiss cases
during their pendency based upon unilateral actions of
tribal defendants to create new proceedings or appellate
remedies and/or alter the legal predicate for the
underlying custodial circumstances.320 This exacts a
serious toll on ICRA’s goal of protecting individual rights.
Indeed, it may be argued that the sum total of these
interpretive measures has nearly eviscerated ICRA’s
impact as a remedy for recognition and enforcement of
civil rights.
C. Problems in the Application of ICRA
There are several problems with how federal
courts have interpreted and applied ICRA and Santa
Clara Pueblo over the years. First, while most have
articulated a standard of “detention” commensurate with
See, e.g., Quair v. Sisco, 359 F. Supp. 2d 948, 967 (2004);
Poodry, 85 F.3d at 879 (concluding that the circumstances of
banishment constituted criminal conduct sufficient for the
purposes of a writ of habeas corpus).
319 Dry Creek Lodge, Inc. v. Arapahoe and Shoshone Tribes,
623 F.2d 682, 685 (10th Cir. 1980).
320 See, e.g., Jeffredo v. Macarro, 599 F.3d 913, 921 (9th Cir.
2010); Napoles v. Rogers, No. 1:16-cv-01933-DAD-JLT, 2017
WL 2930852, at *6 (E.D. Cal. July 10, 2017), aff’d, 743 F.
App’x 136 (9th Cir. 2018).
318
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that understood in federal habeas law in other contexts,
some courts, such as the Ninth Circuit, have suggested
that “detention” under §1303 should be more narrowly
construed than with respect to the federal habeas
statutes.321 As discussed above, that is not supported by
ICRA’s legislative history, and it causes further
restriction on the enforceability of ICRA’s substantive
rights.
Additionally, many lower court opinions infuse
their ultimate analysis of the jurisdictional question with
an independent weighing of sovereign concerns over and
above those that informed the Supreme Court’s opinion
in Santa Clara Pueblo. For example, in its most recent
decision under ICRA, the Ninth Circuit framed its
analysis with a section entitled “Principles Animating
Habeas Jurisdiction Under § 1303 of the Indian Civil
Rights Act.”322 The court announced: “We ground our
opinion in two foundational principles in the Indian law
canon—tribal sovereignty and congressional primacy in
Indian affairs.”323 The two principles were combined to
reach the interpretive conclusion that the court should
refrain from interpreting federal statutes in a way that
See supra notes 108–26 and accompanying text.
Tavares v. Whitehouse, 851 F.3d 863, 869 (9th Cir. 2017).
323 Id.; see Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd., Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue
of New Mexico, 458 U.S. 832, 846 (1982) (“We have
consistently admonished that federal statutes and
regulations relating to tribes . . . must be ‘construed
generously in order to comport with . . . traditional notions of
[Indian] sovereignty and with the federal policy of
encouraging tribal independence.’” (alteration in original)
(quoting White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S.
136, 144 (1980)).
321
322
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limits tribal autonomy unless there are “clear
indications” that Congress intended to do so.324 As
articulated by the Ninth Circuit in another case: “Given
the often vast gulf between tribal traditions and those
with which federal courts are more intimately familiar,
the judiciary should not rush to create causes of action
that would intrude on these delicate matters.”325
As indicated above, there is strong evidence in the
legislative record that Congress intended to create
federal enforcement of ICRA’s substantive rights, taking
into account tribal traditions in the selection of rights to
be guaranteed under the Act; and it is the federal
judiciary that intrudes on the balance established by
Congress by elevating a presumed deference to tribal
sovereignty as a reason to decline jurisdiction in cases
like Tavares and Napoles without explicitly identifying
the sovereign interests that would be harmed and the
cost to the community at large and individual petitioners
that federal inaction imposes.326
By including blanket deference to tribal
sovereignty, over and above analysis of the
circumstances surrounding whether there has been a
detention, the federal judiciary has caused an undue
weighting of that goal. Not only does that give it
disproportionate weight with respect to Congress’s goal
of protecting individuals from serious civil rights
violations, but it results in unduly broad and inaccurate
judgments of the sovereign interest at stake in any
particular case. In many cases, this happens without
even assessing what specific tribal traditions, interests
or other measure of autonomy actually would be
324 See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 72
(1978).
325 Jeffredo, 599 F.3d at 918 (quoting Santa Clara Pueblo,
436 U.S. at 72 n.32).
326 See supra notes 277–84 and accompanying text.
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undermined. Rather, it is a loose and presumed deference
to tribal forums and laws that is afforded and justifies
abstention of federal judicial review. In this manner,
remedies for those whose rights have been violated have
been virtually eviscerated, except in the rare
circumstances where there is a tribal forum, or where the
individual is incarcerated or permanently banished and
has managed to exhaust all tribal remedies existing prior
to and even during the pending federal litigation.
Additionally, and this is perhaps the more
significant point to be made, without a more
sophisticated assessment of the particular sovereign
interests and the way in which a specific tribe or even
several tribes’ ability to preserve its traditions, cultural
identity and ability to engage in self-determination may
be impacted by the enforcement of the individual rights
asserted, summary deference to tribal sovereignty
essentially eviscerates both of ICRA’s goals, thereby
nullifying it as a source of civil rights protections.327 This
diminishment of the sovereign or cultural interests may
occur, for example, if there is no accountability and
review of disenrollment decisions that deplete a
significant sector of the tribe’s membership. It may occur
also when certain interests in land use and occupancy are
at issue, since the ability to live contiguously on land
reserved for the livelihood and wellbeing of individuals
and families is core to sovereignty. When the interests
327 In addition to limiting the remedies available to
individuals in the face of substantive civil rights violations,
an argument may be made that federal courts diminish the
very sovereignty they claim to protect. However, this is a
subject that goes beyond the scope of this article and will be
addressed in a separate paper.
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involve federal trust agreements and/or the land base
and decision-making authority of other tribes, the need
for federal review becomes even more imperative.
Petitions involving actions taken in retaliation for
citizen-based advocacy aimed at strengthening governing
processes and accountability may also implicate these
interests. Civil rights violations themselves and the
impact they have on individuals and community
members at large may exert their own impact on the
strength and viability of the ability of a community to
effectively engage in self-determination.
In response to concerns about civil rights under
these interpretive restrictions, some have called for a
revision of ICRA itself in order to address this problem.328
Others have proposed tackling it from a human rights
standpoint outside of the federal framework.329 Others
have called upon increased support for tribal sovereignty
through greater reform within tribal systems combined
with federal support and funding for such reforms,
limited waivers of sovereign immunity, the creation of
specialized intertribal courts of appeals to address

See, e.g., Carla Christofferson, Note, Tribal Courts’
Failure to Protect Native Women: A Reevaluation of the
Indian Civil Rights Act, 101 YALE L. J. 169, 170 (1992);
Robert C. Jeffrey, Jr., Essay, The Indian Civil Rights Act and
The Martinez Decision: A Reconsideration, 35 S.D. L. REV.
355, 356 (1990).
329 ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., LIKE A LOADED WEAPON: THE
REHNQUIST COURT, INDIAN RIGHTS, AND THE LEGAL HISTORY
OF RACISM IN AMERICA 188–95 (2005); Robert T.
Coulter, Using International Human Rights Mechanisms to
Promote and Protect Rights of Indian Nations and Tribes in
the United States: An Overview, 31 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 573,
573–74 (2007); Klint A. Cowan, International Responsibility
FOR Human Rights Violations By American Indian Tribes, 9
YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 1, 42–43 (2006).
328
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membership disputes and other issues impacting core
sovereignty concerns.330
In the meantime, and as long as there is an ICRA,
federal courts would do well to apply ICRA in a manner
that restores it as a functioning civil rights enforcement
statute and gives meaning to Congress’s intended goals.
There are several points in the analysis that warrant
reconsideration. One is surrounding the scope of Santa
Clara Pueblo. Although widely accepted as immutable
authority in terms of restricting federal review to the
scope of habeas detention, the result in Santa Clara
Pueblo, as described above, is not borne out in the
legislative history of ICRA. However, even if the rule in
Santa Clara Pueblo is the correct degree of interpretive
deference to be given to the scope of enforcement remedy
created by ICRA, the case does not in itself preclude
federal court review of as many habeas cases as have
been held not to meet § 1303’s definition of “detention.”
Cases such as Tavares’ and Napoles’ narrowing of the
scope of detention under ICRA from that under other
federal habeas statutes exemplify one aspect of this
doctrinal narrowing occurring since Santa Clara
Pueblo.331
Another example of this unduly restrictive
interpretive approach that bears restructuring es is with

330 See, e.g., Gabriel S. Galanda & Ryan D. Dreveskracht,
Curing the Tribal Disenrollment Epidemic, 57 ARIZ. L. REV.
383, 472 (internal citations omitted) (2015); Pointer-Thorne,
supra note 168.
331 See supra notes 114–25 and 242–53 and accompanying
text.
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respect to the doctrines of mootness and exhaustion.332
While exhaustion of existing tribal remedies may well be
justified deference to the sovereign prerogative in cases
where there are legitimate remedies that provide a
reasonable and timely expectation of review, it is critical
that the federal courts critically analyze the factual and
legal context before determining justiciability. Allowing
tribal respondents to evade federal review by
manipulating justiciability doctrines like mootness and
exhaustion during the pendency of habeas litigation has
an especially deleterious impact on ICRA’s efficacy as an
instrument of rights enforcement as it enables tribal
defendants to evade judicial review through procedural
gamesmanship.333 Not only do petitioners in those cases
oftentimes remain in custody or under other effect from
the rights violations during the pendency of the revised
proceedings, but they and their advocates may suffer
from more retaliatory actions while tribal laws, legal
structures and processes, and officials who staff them
may be changed to advance the outcome desired by the
tribe.334 Any damage to the collective sovereign interests
of the tribe will also be advanced during this pendency.
See supra notes 143-47 and 252–54 and accompanying
text.
333 See supra notes 143–47 and 252–54 and accompanying
text. Again, this subject and details of the reform needed lie
beyond the scope of this article, but it bears noting as it
intersects with the scope of habeas and arguments about
what constitutes a “detention.”
334 The author, through her representation of individual
petitioners over the years in Napoles v. Rogers and several
other habeas cases, can attest personally to the weathering
effect on petitioners and their counsel of these cases,
especially when federal courts decline to exercise their
jurisdiction in the name of exhaustion. Not only does
declining federal review permit tribal officials to take actions
to effectuate the outcomes they desire by manipulating legal
332
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Like the court in Dry Creek Lodge determined,
Santa Clara Pueblo need not preclude all causes of
action, only those directly impacting or diminishing a
particularly significant sovereign interest of the tribe,
such as control over tribal membership criteria and
rules.335 Even where a significant sovereign interest may
be identified, it must be balanced against other interests
such as the impact on the rights of the petitioners
involved and on the ability of the collective membership
and sovereignty itself to engage in effective and
appropriate self-governance under the complex web of
tribal and federal legal constructs that define it in every
tribal context.
Most importantly, if federal courts are to undergo
analysis in each case of how to balance the requirements
structures, their staffing and the laws themselves, but
maintaining a defense over time is incredibly onerous.
Petitioners, who are sometimes elderly, may die or suffer
from illness. The time and cost of maintaining rigorous
litigation and defense over time may be prohibitive. It is
difficult also to find lawyers able or willing to represent
petitioners. Those, such as the author, who engage in this
work on a pro bono basis, and those supervising students in
clinical programs in law schools such as the University of
New Mexico’s Southwest Indian Law Clinic may be
challenged to maintain such complex, dynamic, and rigorous
advocacy over time, along with other cases and obligations
that they must meet. The parties and their counsel may
literally become exhausted and unable to mount continued
defenses when the legal doctrines of exhaustion and mootness
are applied without careful analysis of the circumstances
involved and the impacts that will likely ensue.
335 Dry Creek Lodge, Inc. v. Arapahoe and Shoshone Tribes,
623 F.2d 682, 685 (10th Cir. 1980).
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of ICRA in enforcing civil rights with any particular
sovereign interests justifying restraint, it is imperative
for federal courts to do that carefully and with
particularity. Specifically, it is imperative that they
assess the seriousness and impact of the alleged rights
violations and conduct a different, more nuanced way of
analyzing tribal sovereignty, rather than referencing the
general importance of tribal sovereignty and summarily
dismissing the case. While resolution of this issue goes
beyond the scope of this article, the following factors
should be evaluated when analyzing whether any
particular sovereign interests weigh in favor of dismissal
in the context of an ICRA habeas petition:
n The precise sovereign interest at stake in
association with the alleged civil rights’
violation, i.e., whether it is exercise of
criminal jurisdiction, enrollment and
tribal membership, economic development
interests, dominion over land, upholding
governance principles, a cultural or
traditional norm, etc.;
n The precise way in which that sovereign
interest potentially would be impacted by
exercise of federal jurisdiction;
n Assessment and balancing of the divergent
interests
involved,
i.e.,
individual,
community, tribal, inter-tribal, federal,
and a method for prioritizing among them
when in conflict;
n Whether there are, in fact, any legitimate
and effective appellate or habeas remedies
to be pursued within the tribal setting by
way of exhaustion as determined at the
time of filing;

[182]

120

Volume 14, Issue 1 (Summer 2019)
THE NEED FOR MORE EXACTING ASSESSMENT OF THE
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND SOVEREIGN INTERESTS AT STAKE
IN FEDERAL COURT INTERPRETATION OF “DETENTION”
UNDER THE INDIAN CIVIL RIGHTS ACT’S REMEDY OF
HABEAS CORPUS
14 TENN. J.L. & POL’Y 61 (2019)

n Whether perceived remedies yet existing
once a federal action has been filed were
created during the pendency of that federal
action in an effort to subvert federal
review;
n The extent to which federal funding or
other authority or decision-making is
implicated in the tribal action, i.e., in
providing law enforcement investigation or
prosecutorial assistance, prison or jail
facilities, funding to tribal courts, etc.;
n The extent to which the tribal action
implicates
federal
interests,
trust
responsibility,
land
allocation
or
management, or federal funds or
programs;
n Whether and to what extent there is a
dispute about governance and/or lawful
governance authority of the official taking
action;
n The age and strength of the tribal judicial
systems available and the extent to which
interference or dysfunction with those
processes is alleged as a part of the habeas
petition, i.e., that processes have been
circumvented, judicial officers or courts
terminated
or
disbanded,
lawyers
excluded, or that previously recognized
principles of judicial independence or
consensus-based governance have been
undermined, etc.
n The extent to which the tribe has restored
independent self-determination within its
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n

n

n

n

legal systems versus the role of federal
government in oversight, funding, staffing
or other influence in the operable tribal
legal systems and laws. Federal judicial
deference to tribal sovereignty is more
questionable
where
the
federal
government exercises influence in the
tribal system and/or the laws and
processes are still patterned off of ones
developed and imposed by the federal
government.
Whether the alleged rights violations are
ones taken in retaliation by certain tribal
officials in response to perceived action
against the petitioner(s) in furtherance of
alleged community interests or cultural
and traditional norms because, if so, the
federal court should resist dismissal until
careful analysis is done to ensure the
community interests and self-governance
of the tribe are in proper hands;
Whether and to what extent the alleged
rights violations appear to be influenced by
external business or political interests, i.e.,
to
expand
gaming
or
economic
development motives, where the tribal
defendants may stand to personally
benefit or are advocating for the interests
other governing bodies or the collective
membership;
Whether the rights violations implicate
diminishment of private land or business
interests, tribal land base, and/or models of
use and occupancy by individuals;
The extent to which other tribes besides
the one whose officials are defendants in
[184]
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the habeas action have interests at stake;
and
n The extent to which the allegedly
infringing action promotes or undermines
the ability of the collective tribal
membership or community to exercise selfdetermination.
It should not be sufficient for a court to cite to the
general and competing goals of individual rights and
tribal sovereignty, or even Congressional primacy in
Indian affairs, and then dismiss the case in presumed
deference to those goals. The issue of tribal sovereignty
and its relation to individual rights is much more
complex and nuanced.
Not every alleged rights violation presents the
same challenge to tribal sovereignty. For example,
review of criminal convictions or detentions that are
alleged also to violate tribal law and abuse of checks and
balances within tribal government may advance both
individual and sovereign interests. In other cases, such
as where multiple tribal interests and governing
authority may be involved or federal trust agreements,
lands, or matter of federal trust responsibility
implicated, or those where individuals are disenrolled
and excluded from opportunities and services critical to
their identity and rights as individuals and Native
Americans, careful federal review may actually best
ensure that the sovereign interests of the tribe be
protected. In some circumstances – for example, in a
tribal setting with a well-established jurisprudence and
multi-level judiciary that has yet to have a chance to
resolve the underlying claims – deference to the tribal
[185]

123

Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy, Vol. 14, Iss. 1 [2019], Art. 1
TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
VOLUME 14 | SUMMER 2019 | ISSUE 1

remedy, and dismissal from federal court, may be the
appropriate decision. However, in ones with fledgling
and underfunded legal systems, lacking in some critical
element necessary for their functioning or presenting
some evidence of dysfunction or disruption to the normal
processes in response to what is alleged to have happened
in the habeas petition, the same deference may create a
devastating outcome for petitioners and the community
at large. In any case, it would be necessary for the court
to analyze in detail, with factual presentation about the
legal systems and actual manner in which it functioned
in a given case, to ascertain that.
The officials of every organization and
government, within and outside tribal governments, are
capable of making sound decisions or ones in error or
even in direct contravention of legal authority. In tribal
communities, there is often great influence -- economic,
historical and political – exerted by the federal
government and other external entities, such as private
corporations wishing to capitalize on economic
development opportunities on tribal lands. When these
forces combine, not only may individual rights be
violated, as tribal officials attempt to take land, moneys
and opportunities from others and/or coerce or punish
those who speak out against desired actions, but the
collective interests of the community at large and its
ability to engage in self-governance in accordance to
customs, traditions and laws may be undermined.
When scarce land set aside for the homes and
livelihood of individuals is taken for development
interests, for example, what happens to the ability of
individuals and families to be able to continue to be
secure in their ability to reside and sustain livelihoods?
Is not that fundamental to tribal sovereignty?
If
individuals in tribes with small membership pools are
dis-enrolled in order to maximize economic gain for the
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interests of a few, what happens to the resulting pool of
those able to sustain the functions and communities of
the tribe. Is not a critical number of members necessary
to the sustainability of sovereignty too? When those who
speak out in the protection of the rule of law, tribal
custom and tradition, opposing unauthorized taking of
power and land, is it not in the benefit of all members to
protect them from incarceration and banishment as a
result of their actions? If tribal remedies are lacking or
there are allegations that they have been usurped by
those engaged in corrupt practices or abuse of power,
would it not be appropriate for federal courts to
incorporate careful consideration of those factors in their
analysis under ICRA? And what about when the
interests of several tribes and even the federal trust
responsibility or other form of federal interest are alleged
to be violated by the offending actions? Should that not
also be a basis for federal judicial review?
Without some form of federal review, there is all
too often little or no accountability for actions rooted in
corruption, greed or mismanagement of tribal lands,
resources and services. Lands can be sold or developed to
better outside development interests that may not
benefit tribal member. Membership can be diminished,
or even terminated, to the point of extinguishment of
critical pool of members to form a viable community.
Those community members advocating for accountability
and compliance with laws and traditions may be
harassed, injured, or eliminated from the governance and
collective voice of the tribe itself. People critical to a
tribe’s ability to exercise its sovereignty and selfdetermination in healthy and sustainable ways can be
incarcerated, banished, or otherwise alienated from the
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community, leaving the tribe itself more vulnerable to
damage from outside political and economic forces. The
factual circumstances in the cases brought before the
courts reflect these real concerns.336
Sovereignty is critical to the ability of indigenous people
to sustain their livelihood, customs, traditions and ability
to engage in good governance and self-determination. In
its best form, matters of individual and collective rights
and their abuses would be resolved under the legal
systems and laws of each tribe with fairness and due
process to all involved as well as with careful
consideration of the short- and long-term impacts on the
tribe’s sovereignty and the ability of the tribes’ members
to effectively engage in self-determination. However, in
recognition of the fact that tribes, like their state, local
and federal governmental counterparts, are not always
perfect in their realization of protection of individual
rights and goals critical to a well-functioning sovereign,
Congress enacted ICRA. That Act does provide for
federal review of substantive rights violations that
qualify for habeas review. It did also take into account
and balance the interests of tribal sovereignty. Unless
federal courts undertake a factually-rigorous and
accurate review of the interests, impacts and nuances of
the individual and sovereign impacts in each case,
however, there is no way for them to legitimately
conclude that the “animating principles” of deference to
tribal sovereignty and self-determination are best
achieved by dismissal of habeas petitions seeking legal
redress. Without doing so they afford a deference to tribal
sovereignty, not anticipated by Congress, nor warranted
under the terms and legislative history of the Act itself,

336 Section III of this article details the various cases that
have been presented to the federal courts for review, invoking
the array of concerns described herein.
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rendering it ineffective as an instrument of civil rights
enforcement in all but the most particular of cases.
VI. Conclusion
The role tribal sovereignty should play and the
way it should be construed with respect to ICRA and the
enforcement of individual civil rights has a long and
contentious history. Many viewed ICRA itself as a
grievous assault on tribal sovereignty. For those, Santa
Clara Pueblo was ushered in as a welcome and
appropriate interpretation of Congressional intent.
As established in this article, however, Santa
Clara Pueblo may have restricted federal review under
ICRA beyond Congressional intent, and the lower courts
have continued the restrictive interpretive agenda to
such an extent that few remedies are actually available.
Like an unfunded mandate, ICRA thus becomes an act
with largely unenforceable standards. While some tribes
provide suitable mechanisms and waivers of sovereign
immunity, most do not, leaving individuals in very
grievous situations without any redress. Additionally,
the very interest that federal courts often seek to protect
– tribal sovereignty and self-determination itself – may
unwittingly be diminished where federal courts swiftly
and summarily reject habeas actions, rather than go to
the merits.
The law of federal habeas recognizes a need for
relief in many circumstances other than actual
incarceration. While there is a need to revisit whether
habeas itself provides a suitable measure of redress,
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federal courts may revive some of ICRA’s intended
purposes by adhering to an appropriate scope for
“detention” and conducting a detailed and case-specific
analysis of the particular sovereign interests at stake
and how they would be undermined by federal review of
the merits of petitioners’ allegations of individual rights
violations. Without that, ICRA remains an elusive and
largely hollow articulation of rights. While it has
impacted the jurisprudence of some tribal justice systems
and produced concrete federal habeas relief for a few
individual parties, the vast majority of rights violations
go unchecked. The greater impact is on the collective
interests of the sovereignty at large.
In the words of one of the founding fathers of the
American Constitutional system of governance:
If [a] legislature can disfranchise any
number of citizens at pleasure by general
descriptions, it may soon confine all the votes
to a small number of partisans, and
establish an aristocracy or an oligarchy; if it
may banish at discretion all those whom
particular circumstances render obnoxious,
without hearing or trial, no man can be safe,
nor know when he may be the innocent
victim of a prevailing faction. The name of
liberty applied to such a government, would
be a mockery of common sense.337
Although infused of history and cultural
attributes independent and different from those
337 United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 444 (1964)
(emphasis added) (quoting 3 John C. Hamilton, History of the
Republic of the United States: As Traced in the Writings of
Alexander Hamilton and of His Contemporaries 34 (New
York, D. Appelton 1859).
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contributing to the establishment of the United
States and, thus, entitled to a different measure of
review in some instances than would occur in cases
alleging violations by federal, state or local
governmental actors, tribes without remedies are
no less susceptible to these impacts.
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